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Maryland citizens are far more likely to come into contact with 
administrative agencies during the course of their lives than any 
other branchl of government.2 A citizen's contact with administra-
tive agencies varies markedly and can range from applying for a 
motor vehicle license3 to being fined for failing to comply with an 
agency's regulation.4 As a creature of statute, however, an adminis-
I. While not technically considered one of the traditional branches of govern-
ment, many commentators liken administrative agencies to a branch of govern-
ment co-equal to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. See Frederick 
R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status oj the Administrative Agencies, 36 
AM. U. L. REv. 277, 278 (1987) ("Delegation is the broad channel through 
which increasing power has flowed to what many feel is a de facto fourth 
branch."); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Adminis-
trative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 
I, 1 (1994) ("Uustice RobertJackson] coined the term 'fourth branch' to de-
scribe administrative agencies and contended that this fourth branch 'has de-
ranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth di-
mension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.''' (quoting FTC v. 
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) Uackson, j., dissenting»; Richard Pos-
ner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 29 
(1987) (" Oludicial interpretations have, by authorizing a 'Fourth Branch' of 
administrative agencies by expansively construing congressional power over in-
terstate and foreign commerce and congressional power to enact statutes that 
purportedly promote the general welfare, greatly strengthened the power of 
the federal government to regulate markets."). 
2. See Thomas O. Sargentich, Teaching Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, I WIDNER]. PUB. L. 147, 148 (1992) (noting that " [d]ay-to-day encounters 
between the government and the public most commonly involve agencies as 
opposed to courts or legislatures"). 
3. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-606 (1998). 
4. See, e.g., COMAR 08.07.01.17 (requiring a dog to be on a leash in state parks 
and requiring pets to be "kept under reasonable control"). For example, Ma-
ryland dog owners who fail to leash their dogs in local parks are first issued 
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trative agency's regulatory authority does not reach beyond those 
powers conveyed to it by its organic legislation-the agency's ena-
bling statute.5 
A recurring issue in administrative law is the extent to which an 
agency may lawfully exercise power when its enabling statute con-
tains a broad delegation of power.6 In Lussier v. Maryland Racing 
Commission,? the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether 
an administrative agency may impose a fine absent explicit authority 
to do so in its enabling statute. 8 In resolving this issue in the 
agency's favor, the court of appeals expanded the power agencies 
may imply from broad enabling statutes.9 
Specifically, the Lussier court addressed a regulation promul-
gated by the Maryland Racing Commission (MRC).IO The regulation 
permitted the MRC to issue fines for violations of various MRC reg-
ulations.ll However, the broad enabling statute that empowered the 
MRC to promulgate its regulation did not explicitly authorize the 
MRC to create a regulation permitting fines. 12 Nevertheless, the 
MRC imposed a $5000 fine on Frank P. Lussier after it determined 
warnings by park rangers, but "a second scolding will most likely mean a 
ticket, and repeat offenses could lead to a $5,000 fine." Candus Thomson, Ur-
ban An~t Intrudes on Outdoor Trails; Recreation Etiquette Encouraged l7y Police, THE 
SUN (BALT.), June 8, 1998, at B1. 
5. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 683, 
393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978). An enabling statute is "any statute enabling persons 
or corporations, or administrative agencies to do what before they could not 
do. It is applied to statutes which confer new powers." BlACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 364 (6th ed. 1990). A legislature "creates an agency by enacting a statute 
(usually called an 'enabling act' or an 'organic statute' interchangeably), 
which provides rules that control and limit the agency's exercise of its author-
ity." Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 567, 569 (1992). While the terms "organic statute" and "enabling statute" 
are synonymous, this Note refers to these statutes as enabling statutes for the 
purpose of consistency and because of the term's superior descriptive quali-
ties-these statutes enable the agency to carry out the very purpose of its exis-
tence. 
6. See infra notes 49-146, 168-79, 183-264 and accompanying text. 
7. 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996). 
8. See id. at 684-85, 684 A.2d at 805. 
9. For a discussion of how Lussier broadened Maryland law, see infra notes 482-
508 and accompanying text. 
lO. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 684-85, 684 A.2d at 805. 
11. See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. 
12. See id. at 687, 684 A.2d at 807 (construing MD. CODE ANN .. Bus. REG. § 11-210 
(1992»; id. at 710,684 A.2d at 818 (Bell, J., dissenting) (construing MD. CODE 
ANN., Bus. REG. § 11-210 (1992». 
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that he had engaged in conduct that violated several of the MRC's 
administrative regulations. 13 Lussier sought judicial review of the 
MRC's decision, challenging both the constitutionality of the delega-
tion of powerl4 and the MRC's construction of its enabling statute. 15 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the validity of the 
administrative regulation promulgated by the MRC that authorized 
the fine. 16 Specifically, the Lussier court held that the MRC's self-
created power to fine was valid without explicit authority in its ena-
bling statute. 17 The MRC's regulation was upheld because it was 
promulgated pursuant to a broad statutory delegation of authority 
and was consistent with the legislative history and prior applications 
of the statute. IS Following Lussier, Maryland courts enjoy greater dis-
cretion in determining the validity of an agency's power to fine 
under broad statutory grants. 19 
This Note attempts to synthesize the pertinent areas of adminis-
trative law that underlie the court of appeals's decision in Lussier.21J 
Part II briefly develops the relevant areas of federal administrative 
law from which many states have developed their administrative law 
jurisprudenceY Part III addresses state administrative law by explor-
ing Maryland's constitutional framework for decisionmaking.22 Part 
IV focuses on Maryland's common-law rules of statutory construc-
tion.23 The statutory construction analysis focuses on canons unique 
13. See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. For a further discussion of the regulations 
Lussier violated, see infra notes 439-41. 
14. In Lussier's brief submitted to the court of appeals, he challenged the consti-
tutionality of the MRC's acts and the legislature's standard-less delegation of 
power by relying on three seminal nondelegation doctrine cases of the court 
of appeals. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-19, Lussier v. Maryland Racing 
Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996) (No. 94-96). For a discussion of 
the three opinions relied on by Lussier and distinguished by the court of ap-
peals, see infra notes 454-64 and accompanying text. However, in its majority 
opinion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland eschewed the constitutional issues 
raised. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 682-700, 684 A.2d at 804-13. 
15. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190,202,640 A.2d 259, 
265 (1994), a/I'd, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996). For a discussion of the 
procedural history of the case, see infra notes 442-52 and accompanying text. 
16. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 700, 684 A.2d at 813. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. at 687-700, 684 A.2d at 807-13. 
19. See infra notes 482-508 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 468-508 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 28-161 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 162-266 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 267-395 and accompanying text. 
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to administrative law and incorporates illustrative examples of Mary-
land cases.24 Part V explains the background of Lussier, as well as 
the court's holding and rationale.25 Finally, Part VI analyzes troub-
ling aspects of the court's reasoning and discusses Lussier's potential 
impact on Maryland administrative law.26 The analysis explores how 
other states have dealt with analogous issues and concludes with 
recommendations to practitioners.27 
II. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. Separation of Powers 
The first three Articles of the United States Constitution estab-
lished the legislative,28 executive,29 and judiciapo branches of 
America's government. However, the text of the Constitution does 
not contain an explicit provision for the separation of powers 
among the three branches.31 Rather, courts have found the require-
ment of separation of powers implicit in the language used by the 
Framers.32 
While the Framers generally agreed that some method of divid-
ing power in the government they were creating was necessary, sev-
eral different views of what separation of powers meant surfaced 
during the Constitutional Convention. 33 Indeed, one scholar as-
serted that the only thing the Framers agreed on was Madison's 
view in Federalist 47, in which Madison explained that separation of 
powers "can amount to no more than this, that where the whole 
power of one department of the government is exercised by the 
24. See infra notes 267-395 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 396467 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 468-508 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 509-53 and accompanying text. 
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
30. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
31. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE. JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREA-
TISE § 2.1, at 34 (3d ed. 1994) ("If the Framers decided to incorporate a free-
standing separation of powers requirement in the Constitution, that decision 
was implicit rather than explicit."). 
32. See id.; see also James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims 
Acts Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701, 748 (1993) (" '[T]he 
principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in 
the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted 
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.''' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 124 (1976)(alteration in original»). 
33. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.1, at 34-35. 
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same hands which possess the whole power of another department, 
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."34 
Madison emphasized that the principal reason for having a separa-
tion of powers provision was to prevent tyranny.35 Thus, the Found-
ing Fathers were aware that separating the government's power was 
necessary to preserve a democracy.36 
The method the Framers chose to separate governmental 
power is evident from the language employed in the first three Arti-
cles. Article I of the Constitution established the legislative branch 
of the federal government. 37 Article I, section 1 states that" [a] 11 leg-
islative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States."38 This provision specifically vests the federal govern-
ment's legislative power in Congress.39 A principle function of Arti-
cle I was to ensure that the public's interest would be protected 
through a process of deliberation and debate.40 
In Article II, section 1, the Constitution declares that "[ t] he ex-
ecutive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America. "41 Finally, Article III provides that the "judicial Power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish. "42 Read together, the provisions in these three Arti-
cles have been construed to form the separation of powers 
doctrine.43 
While the Constitution clearly did not provide for a fourth co-
equal branch of government, courts recognized early on that ad-
ministrative agencies were permissible and necessary.44 The Neces-
34. Id. § 2.1, at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35. Madison noted: "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and ju-
diciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether he-
reditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very defini-
tion of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 Games Madison) (Garry Wills 
ed., 1982). 
36. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 51, at 321 Games Madison), No. 78, at 466 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
37. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § l. 
38. Id. 
39. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 66. 
40. SeeAuRED C. AMAN.JR. & WILLIAM T. MArrON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 14 (1993). 
4l. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § l. 
42. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § l. 
43. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-98 (1988). 
44. See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940) (noting that adminis-
trative agencies have the power to initiate inquiry and control investigations in 
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sary and Proper Clause permits Congress to "make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Of-
ficer thereof. "45 This Clause provides the principal constitutional ba-
sis for allowing Congress to create and empower administrative 
agencies.46 Thus, the early struggle was not about whether an ad-
ministrative agency could exist; instead, courts wrestled with the ex-
tent to which Congress could delegate powers to these agencies.47 
The nondelegation doctrine came into existence as a result of this 
struggle.48 
B. Separation oj Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Conceptually, the separation of powers doctrine prevents one 
branch of government from exercising the constitutionally ordained 
the arenas of transportation, communication, and other essential public ser-
vices); Brown v. Warner Holding Co., 50 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D. Minn. 1943) 
(explaining that constitutional requirements are met when Congress sets forth 
a policy along with standards for its application and then delegates the details 
essential to carry out the legislative policy to an administrative agency); Hen-
derson v. Kimmel, 47 F. Supp. 635, 642 & n.lO (D. Kan. 1942) (noting that 
Congress may delegate to an administrative agency the power to determine 
the details necessary to carry out the legislative purpose). 
45. U.S. CONSf. art. I, § 8, d. 18. 
46. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, at 11 (explaining that under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, Congress has the authority to create administrative agen-
cies for legislative responsibilities); Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Out-
law Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REv. 471, 
523-24 (1986) (explaining that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Con-
gress has the authority to create administrative agencies for judicial responsi-
bilities) . 
47. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939). The Su-
preme Court summarized the long-standing recognition of the legitimacy of 
administrative agencies as follows: 
From the earliest days the Congress has been compelled to leave 
to the administrative officers of the Government authority to deter-
mine facts which were to put legislation into effect and the details of 
regulations which would implement the more general enactments. It 
is well settled, therefore, that it is no argument against the constitu-
tionality of an act to say that it delegates broad powers to executives 
to determine the details of any legislative scheme. This necessary au-
thority has never been denied. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
48. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text. 
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power of a coordinate branch.49 Technically, administrative agencies 
fall within the executive branch of the federal government.50 From a 
purist's perspective, administrative agencies are confined to exercis-
ing executive powers.5! Courts have recognized, however, that "a 
hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one 
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of 
governing itself effectively. "52 
Separation of powers challenges can arise with respect to each 
branch of government and do not require a delegation of power to 
occur.53 However, when Congress delegates power to an administra-
tive agency that arguably confers excessive legislative power, a sepa-
ration of powers issue arises under what courts and commentators 
have dubbed the non delegation doctrine.54 Collectively, commenta-
49. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (holding that the 
delegation to the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate sen-
tencing guidelines did not amount to an excessive delegation of legislative 
power); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (holding that "the in-
tegrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the 
[C]onstitution" prevents Congress from delegating its legislative power to an-
other branch). 
50. See 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE, § 7.11, at 366 
(2d ed. 1997) ("Most agencies are 'executive' agencies, those housed in the 
executive branch. There are two types of executive agencies: agencies in one 
of the cabinet departments and 'independent' executive agencies."); see also 
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) 
(involving an antitrust suit by trucking company against a competitor). The 
Court stated that "administrative agencies ... are both creatures of the legis-
lature, and arms of the executive [branch]." Id. 
5l. Cf. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1985, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 
293, 293 (1986) (noting Attorney General Meese's view that '"quasi-legislative' 
or 'quasijudicial' functions [can never] be properly delegated to independent 
agencies"). But see 2 KOCH, supra note 50, § 7.10, at 366 ("Administrative law 
enthusiasts reject a wooden commitment to separation of powers as they ana-
lyze the bureaucracy's place among the 'constitutional' branches."). 
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (explaining that although separation 
of powers is an essential check against tyranny, the Framers also recognized 
that completely separate branches of government would hinder the Nation as 
a whole from governing effectively). 
53. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(" 'In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The exec-
utive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: 
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either 
of them: to the end it may be the government of laws and not of men.' " 
(quoting MAss. CaNsT. art. XXX». 
54. See United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) 
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tors use the terms "delegation doctrine" and "nondelegation doc-
trine" interchangeably55 to refer to the judicially-created doctrine 
that seeks to prevent Congress from divesting itself of its legislative 
power.56 The nondelegation doctrine is merely one method of chal-
lenging the government's behavior under the separation of powers 
doctrineY However, the nondelegation doctrine broadly encom-
passes any improper delegation of power among the several 
branches of the federal government and their institutions.58 This 
("That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, 
clear."); see also Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE LJ. 
657, 657 (1988) ("Delegation becomes excessive when Congress transfers legis-
lative powers without providing adequate guidance about how those powers 
are to be exercised."). Additionally, a separation of powers issue can arise 
when an administrative agency is delegated an excessive amount of judicial or 
executive power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (holding that the independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act did not impermissibly in-
terfere with the President's executive powers); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. 
v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding Congress's delega-
tion of adjudicatory powers to non-Article III bankruptcy judges unconstitu-
tional) . 
55. For example, one commentator noted that Justice Scalia, in commenting on 
the Benzene case, said that the" 'delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the 
ice.' " David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Consti-
tutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 355, 355 (1987) 
(quoting Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REG. 25, 28 (1980». 
Justice Rehnquist, in his dispositive concurring opinion in the Benzene case to 
which Justice Scalia was referring in his Comments, used the term "non-
delegation doctrine" to refer to his opposition to the practice of "Congress['s] 
... delegat[ion of] important choices of social policy to politically unrespon-
sive administrators." Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (The Benzene Case). The above-cited sources illustrate 
the use of technically different terms in referring to the same issue in the 
same context and serve as evidence that they mean the same thing. This Note 
will deal with the narrow issue of Congressional delegation of legislative power 
and will consistently use the term "nondelegation doctrine" to refer to the re-
curring question of the proper extent and degree to which Congress may 
delegate its power. 
56. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 66. 
57. See Schoenbrod, supra note 55, at 387 (characterizing the delegation doctrine 
as a separation of powers sub-issue in which "two branches consent not to be 
separated") . 
58. See 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 12.13, at 174-75; Misty Ventura, Comment, The 
Legislative Veto: A Move Away From Separation of Powers or a Tool to Ensure Nondele-
gation?, 49 SMU L. REv. 401, 401 (1996) ("The separation of powers doctrine 
prevents the accumulation of excessive power in one branch; the nondelega-
tion doctrine prevents one branch from abdicating its authority to another."). 
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Note focuses on the narrow category of the non delegation doctrine 
issues that arise when Congress delegates legislative power to an ad-
ministrative agency. Generally, an analysis of this type of nondelega-
tion doctrine issue by a court begins with the statute that grants the 
administrative agency its power to regulate-the enabling statute.59 
When Congress passes enabling legislation, it creates the 
agency and delineates its regulatory power.60 The power Congress 
confers upon the agency generally includes a grant allowing the 
agency to promulgate regulations to carry out certain policy objec-
tives.61 The power to promulgate regulations-rule making-is often 
barely distinguishable from Congress's power to make laws.62 This 
has led courts and commentators to characterize this administrative 
rulemaking power as quasi-legislative power.63 Thus, it would appear 
as though a separation of powers issue under the nondelegation 
doctrine hides within any exercise of quasi-legislative power by an 
agency. 
A major principle set forth in early Supreme Court opinions 
was that" [s]o long as Congress 'shall lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [ex-
ercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legisla-
tive action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.' "64 
59. See, e.g., infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. For an explanation of what 
an enabling statute is, see supra note 5. 
60. See Werhan, supra note 5, at 569. 
61. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. 
v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). 
62. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 
U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 123 (1994) ("We accept, perhaps uneasily, the delegation 
of substantial lawmaking power to the President, who executes the laws he 
makes. Of course we don't call the President's power 'lawmaking.' We have 
euphemisms-we call this power 'regulatory,' or 'interpretive,' or 'gap-
filling.' "). 
63. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 989 (1983) (explaining that the Su-
preme Court considers rulemaking by administrative agencies to be quasi-
legislative in nature); Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased 
Adjudicator in Administrative Proceedings, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 551, 556 (1991). 
64. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J. w. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928»; see also Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 84849 (1986) (holding that a 
proper delegation of adjudicatory functions must be assessed by reference to 
the underlying purpose of the requirements of Article III); Chadha, 462 U.S. 
at 954 (holding that although Congress can delegate portions of its powers, it 
cannot control administration of its power through a retained veto); Industrial 
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehn-
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This intelligible principle test is one of several jurisprudential at-
tempts to explain the fundamental concept that congressional dele-
gations must contain legislative standards.65 In modern times, the 
substance of these judicially created legislative standards tests has 
imposed a nugatory hurdle in the path of the federal administrative 
regime.66 Administrative agencies churn out regulations with in-
creasing frequency,67 and the federal judiciary has demonstrated a 
heightened sense of reluctance to disturb these acts. 68 Before the 
federal government reached the administrative state of its present 
existence, important precedent developed that continues to influ-
ence judicial decisionmaking.69 
C. The Nondelegation Doctrine in Its Formative Years 
In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, early Supreme Court 
cases required all delegations of legislative authority to contain stan-
dards that guided the agency's exercise of rulemaking powers.70 In 
J W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,71 the Supreme Court first 
enunciated the "intelligible principle" test.72 The Court stated, "[i]f 
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which [an agency] is directed to conform, such legislative action is 
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power. "73 Relying on the ra-
tionale of the J W. Hampton Court, two subsequent Court decisions 
quist, J., concurring) (discussing proper delegations of power, but finding that 
a delegation to OSHA of power to adopt appropriate standards of occupa-
tional exposure of benzene "would violate the doctrine against uncanalized 
delegations") . 
65. See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 
83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1225 (1985) ("Although the Court never disavowed its 
1935 decisions and continued to articulate essentially the same delegation test, 
it has never again held a statute unconstitutional on the basis of the delega-
tion doctrine."). 
66. See id. at 1231. 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Wooten, 343 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1965) (observing 
that there are a "mounting number of matters entrusted to the jurisdiction of 
... agencies"). 
68. See R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize 
What They Do, 31 Loy. LA. L. REv. 167, 206-07 (1997) ("In the modern regula-
tory state, broad delegation of authority strikes most federal judges as desira-
ble if not necessary."). 
69. See infra notes 119-37, 498 and accompanying text. 
70. See infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text. 
71. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
72. See id. at 409. 
73. Id. 
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struck down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA),14 Both cases dealt with delegations of legislative power by 
Congress to the President.75 However, the standards espoused in 
these cases have also been applied to delegations of power by Con-
gress to administrative agencies.76 
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,77 the Supreme Court addressed 
section 9(c) of the NIRA.7B Section 9(c) authorized the President to 
prohibit the transportation, in interstate and foreign commerce, of 
petroleum products produced by any state in excess of certain speci-
fied limits.19 The NIRA authorized the President to issue executive 
orders to carry out these duties.8o Any violation of an executive or-
der under the provision was punishable by a fine or imprison-
ment.8! However, section 9(c) did not set forth any standard to 
guide the President in exercising his authority.82 
Recognizing that there had been a purported delegation of leg-
islative power to the President,83 the Court inquired whether "Con-
gress ha[d] declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether 
the Congress ha[d] set up a standard for the President's action; 
whether the Congress ha[d] required any finding by the President 
in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition."84 The 
Court noted that "Congress ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] estab-
lished no standard, [and] ha[d] laid down no rule" to guide the 
74. See infra notes 77-99 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra notes 77-99 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
77. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
78. See id. at 406. In subsection c, the statute provided: 
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in in-
terstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products 
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount 
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State 
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, 
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. 
Any violation of any order of the President issued under the pro-
visions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed 
$1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both. 
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.c. § 709(c) (1933». 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 406-07. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. at 415. 
83. See id. at 414. 
84. Id. at 415. 
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President's discretion.85 The Court concluded that section 9(c) was 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers.86 The Panama 
Refining Court reasoned that although there was a "declaration of 
policy, "87 there were neither guiding policies nor standards to pre-
vent arbitrary enforcement.88 
Similarly, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,89 the Supreme 
Court voided another section of the NIRA as violative of the 
nondelegation doctrine.9o In Schechter, the petitioners were convicted 
of eighteen counts of violating the Live Poultry Code,91 which was 
85. [d. at 430. 
86. See id. at 433. 
87. [d. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88. See id. at 415-33. Justice Cardozo, in his dissent, conceded the importance of a 
standard to guide discretion in enforcing the terms of the Act. See id. at 434 
(Cardozo, j., dissenting). However, Justice Cardozo disagreed with the major-
ity's opinion that inadequate standards existed. See id. (Cardozo, j., dissent-
ing). Justice Cardozo contended that the President's discretion was curtailed 
by the structure of the Act and that it would be reasonable to import stan-
dards from other statutes. See id. 
89. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
90. See id. at 550-51. 
91. See id. at 519. Section 3(a) provided: 
"Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or 
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code 
or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision 
thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the President 
finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable re-
strictions on admission to membership therein and are truly repre-
sentative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2) 
that such code or codes are not designed to promote monopolies or 
to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to dis-
criminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this 
title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit monopolies 
or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That where such code or 
codes affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in other 
steps of the economic process, nothing in this section shall deprive 
such persons of the right to be heard prior to approval by the Presi-
dent of such code or codes. The President may, as a condition of his 
approval of any such code, impose such conditions (including re-
quirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) 
for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and others, 
and in furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such ex-
ceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code, as the 
President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy 
herein declared." 
[d. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933». 
528 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
promulgated pursuant to section 3 of the NIRA.92 Section 3 allowed 
the President to promulgate "codes of fair competition" and take 
any other measures to effectuate the broad goals set forth in section 
1 of the NIRA.93 The petitioners argued that it was unconstitutional 
because the President was bound by no standards in exercising this 
power. 94 
The Court relied on Panama Refining to determine the validity 
of the legislative delegation.95 The Court explained that a legislative 
delegation must operate "within prescribed limits."96 The Schechter 
Court emphasized that the statute which delegated power to the 
President failed to describe its subject,97 beyond insuring fair com-
petition.98 The Schechter Court held that the delegation was unconsti-
tutional because it failed to set standards to guide the President in 
creating the codes of fair competition.99 
Although Panama Refining and Schechter have not been over-
ruled, some commentators categorize these cases as "doubtful 
precedents."100 Since these cases, Supreme Court decisions have in-
variably permitted even the broadest delegations of power. 101 Moreo-
ver; the Supreme Court has consistently upheld delegations, even 
when power was conferred with minimal or no standards 
whatsoever. 102 
Nothing spurred the growth of the administrative state more 
than President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. 103 Today, it is a well-
92. See id. 
93. Id. at 521 n.4. 
94. See id. at 538-39. 
95. See id. at 529-30. 
96. Id. at 530. 
97. See id. at 530-31. In Panama Refining, the subject described in the Act was the 
prevention of the transportation of "hot oil" in interstate commerce. See Pan-
ama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,430 (1935). 
98. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 530. 
99. See id. at 54142. 
100. 1 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL .• ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 3.03[1], at 3-70 (Matthew 
Bender ed., 1998). 
101. See id. at 3-77. 
102. See Uwe Kischel, Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis 
of United States and German Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 213, 220 (1994) (noting that 
after Schechter and Panama Refining, the Supreme Court has not "use[d] the 
delegation doctrine to strike down any statutes enacted by Congress"); see also, 
e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding the validity of 
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 that contained minimal safeguards). 
103. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 412-13 ("The Consti-
tution's tripartite division of powers . . . has been largely eviscerated in the 
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recognized reality that the legislative and judicial branches are ill-
suited to perform many of the day-to-day functions required of the 
government. 104 From the New Deal Era to present day, the adminis-
trative bureaucracy in the federal government has grown exponen-
tially, taking on a life of its own.105 Indeed, one scholar noted that, 
"[t]he size and scope of federal administrative activity has increased 
during every period in the nation's history."I06 
The Supreme Court has facilitated the growth of federal agency 
power by practically eliminating the requirement of meaningful 
standards to curtail an agency's rulemaking authority.I07 Mter 
Schechter and Panama Refining, the Supreme Court has not struck 
down a delegation of power by Congress to the executive branch on 
constitutional grounds. lOS As federal law developed, the Supreme 
Court has upheld increasingly broad delegations of legislative power 
to administrative agencies. 109 
Courts and scholars have identified several reasons that justified 
and arguably necessitated the need for relaxing the nondelegation 
doctrine. I 10 Administrative agency decisionmaking is often more cost 
effective. 1I1 Additionally, many governmental policy decisions involve 
intricate issues that are more aptly dealt with by expert administra-
tive agencies. 112 This expertise is particularly necessary in areas that 
twentieth century in order to accommodate the exponential growth of the 
modern administrative state."); Ventura, supra note 58, at 402 n.8 ("This regu-
latory authority [granted to administrative agencies] has grown exponentially 
since World War II . . . ."). 
104. See Peter Marra, Have Administrative Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON 
HALL CONST. LJ. 763, 772, 777 (1996). 
105. See Henry G. Manne, The Judiciary and Free Markets, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 
11, 23 (1997) ("The most powerful source of the dilution of the older struc-
ture in American law was the growth, particularly during and after the 'New 
Deal' in the 1930's, of vast amounts of regulatory legislation and the enor-
mous growth of administrative law .... "); Werhan, supra note 5, at 574-75. 
106. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 6. 
107. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (allowing 
OSHA to promulgate regulations regarding toxic materials or harmful physi-
cal agents under a mere "feasibility standard"). 
108. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 73 ("The Court has not held a 
delegation unconstitutional since 1935."). 
109. See, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. at 490. 
110. See infra notes 111-13, 139-41 and accompanying text. 
111. See AMA.N & MAYfON, supra note 40, at 10. 
112. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency Decisions, 43 
ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 516 (1991) (noting that "agencies embody special exper-
tise" such as "superior capacity for compiling the information" and 
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evolve rapidly and require flexibility.ll3 
While it became widely accepted that Congress could delegate 
portions of its lawmaking power, the constitutional principle behind 
the separation of powers and non delegation doctrines remained a 
constant. 114 Even though the nondelegation doctrine may have ex-
perienced a liberalization, it still forbids complete divestment of law-
making power to an unrestrained agency.llS Standards used to cur-
tail excessive delegations of power, such as the intelligible principle 
test, exist primarily because administrative agencies, unlike Con-
gress, lack a fundamental constitutional protective device-political 
accountability.116 While the intelligible principle test was one of the 
more prevalent standards the Supreme Court used to decide 
whether an unconstitutional delegation of power occurred 117 after 
"synthesiz[ing] the information"); Marra, supra note 104, at 767 ("The justifi-
cations for the delegation of congressional power to administrative agencies 
include Congress's inability to handle technical issues and act efficiently and 
effectively.") . 
113. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). In Mistretta, the Su-
preme Court explained the necessity of the non delegation docuine as follows: 
"Our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical 
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate 
power under broad general directives." Id.; see also AMAN & MAYTON, supra 
note 40, at 11. 
114. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 69-70 ("For two centuries, the Su-
preme Court has struggled to reconcile this routine congressional practice 
with the Court's oft-stated belief that Article I prohibits Congress from dele-
gating legislative power."). 
115. See National Cable Television Assoc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) 
(citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 
(1935». 
116. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, at 14 (noting that basic choices cannot be 
passed to agencies because agencies are not "politically responsible officials"); 
Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Su-
preme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint to Congress's Exceptions 
Clause Power, 106 YALE LJ. 197, 200 (1996) (noting that Congress's diminished 
accountability to the electorate by delegating powers to administrative agen-
cies has led many courts and commentators to conclude that unaccountable 
legislation is unconstitutional legislation); David A. Herrman, Comment, To 
Delegate or Not to Delegate-That Is the Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability 
in Administrative Preemption Defies Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28 
PAC. LJ. 1157, 1170 (1997) (explaining that administrative agencies cannot 
have unrestrained power to formulate laws because they are unelected and are 
not politically accountable). 
117. See]. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928) (hold-
ing that the delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency will be 
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1936 the Court seemed to abandon it in large part. 118 
In the early 1980's, it appeared as though a trend toward the 
re-establishment of the legislative standards requirement began to 
develop in Supreme Court jurisprudence.1I9 Notably, Justice Rehn-
quist called for a return to more stringent nondelegation principles 
such as those first espoused by Chief Justice Taft in J W. Hampton. 120 
Justice Rehnquist's philosophical approach to the nondelegation 
doctrine was first articulated in his concurring opinion in Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,121 and later in his dis-
senting opinion in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. 
Donovan. 122 
In American Petroleum, Justice Rehnquist recognized that" [t]he 
rule against delegation of legislative power is not ... so cardinal [a] 
principle as to allow for no exception."123 Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained that Congress may "lay down the general policy and stan-
dards that animate the law," while permitting an executive agency 
to "refine those standards, fill in the blanks, or apply the standards 
to particular cases."124 However, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that 
the constitutionality of a delegation of legislative power "must be 
judged according to common sense and the inherent necessities of 
governmental coordination."125 According to Justice Rehnquist, the 
delegation in American Petroleum was unconstitutional because Con-
gress did not set forth any ascertainable standard to guide the Sec-
retary of Labor in promulgating a benzene exposure limit under 
OSHA.126 American Petroleum illustrates what one scholar described to 
upheld if Congress established an intelligible principle to direct the agency). 
118. See Schoenbrod, supra note 65, at 1231 (noting that the intelligible principle 
test became "so ephemeral and elastic as to lose its meaning"). 
119. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. 
120. For a discussion of the intelligible principle test as enumerated by the J W. 
Hampton Court, see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
121. 448 U.S. 607, 675-76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that a stan-
dard-less delegation to the Secretary of Labor to establish certain OSHA re-
quirements "would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations of leg-
islative power"). 
122. 452 U.S. 490, 545, 548 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that a '"fea-
sibility standard' is no standard at all;" therefore, a Congressional act delegat-
ing to the Secretary of Labor the power to promulgate an OSHA cotton dust 
regulation was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority). 
123. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 673. 
124. Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126. See id. at 675-77. 
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be Justice Rehnquist's "distaste for open-ended delegations" of legis-
lative authority. 127 
Additionally, a recent majority opinion by the Supreme Court 
seemed to indicate an overall resurgence in the nondelegation doc-
trine's legislative standards requirement. Toully v. United States128 ap-
pears to depart from post-1936 delegation doctrine precedent and 
return to the intelligible principle test espoused in J W. Hampton. 129 
In Toully, the Supreme Court considered whether a provision of the 
Controlled Substances Act "unconstitutionally delegate[d] legislative 
power to the Attorney General." 130 The purpose of the Act was to 
establish "an expedited procedure by which the Attorney General 
[could] schedule a substance on a temporary basis when doing so 
[was] necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety."131 
In its rationale, the Supreme Court stated "that the nondelega-
tion doctrine does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, 
within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches." 132 Congress can 
"legislate [] in broad terms" provided the legislation contains " 'in-
telligible principle[s]' " that serve as guideposts for those individu-
als or bodies entrusted to carry out the legislative directive. 133 The 
Court found, however, that "one [could not] plausibly argue that § 
201 (h) 's 'imminent hazard to the public safety' standard [was] not 
an intelligible principle."134 
The Toully Court declined to hold that "something more than 
an 'intelligible principle' is required when Congress authorizes an-
other branch of government to promulgate regulations that contem-
plate criminal sanctions."135 Moreover, the Supreme Court observed 
that the delegation was constitutional because it meaningfully con-
strained the Attorney General by placing specific restrictions on his 
discretion to define criminal conduct. 136 Although the Supreme 
127. Schoenbrod, supra note 65, at 1231 n.39. 
128. 500 u.s. 160 (1991). 
129. See id. at 165; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
1~0. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162. 
131. Id. at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132. Id. at 165 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989». 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 166-67. 
136. See id. at 167-69. In Touby, the Supreme Court rejected three challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at 165-69. First, peti-
tioners argued that the statute violated separation of powers by granting the 
Attorney General too much power. See id. at 167. Petitioners claimed that 
while Congress could delegate the power to schedule drugs to the Executive 
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Court favorably quoted the "intelligible principle" test, the Court 
did not strictly apply it in Touby as it had in Schechter and Panama 
Refining. 137 
Indeed, Touby, rather than marking the resurgence of the 
nondelegation doctrine, looks to have marked its demiseps The 
Court appears to have retreated from strictly applying the nondele-
gation doctrine for three reasons: 
First, they seem to have recognized the extreme difficulty of 
creating a justiciable standard that would allow judges to 
distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional 
delegations. Second, they seem to have adopted a more re-
alistic perspective on the legislative process. Third, the Jus-
tices are less concerned about broad delegations to agencies 
because they now recognize that agencies are politically ac-
countable institutions of govemment. 139 
Acknowledging this last reason, a unanimous Court observed in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,l40 that 
"[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
Branch, the Attorney General could not be the recipient of that power since 
the Attorney General also has the power to prosecute drug offenses. See id. In 
response, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners' argument did not im-
plicate the separation of powers doctrine because the doctrine does not con-
cern itself with the distribution of power within a single branch. See id. at 167-
68. 
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it barred judicial review, noting that in a separate section, the 
Act specifically permitted judicial review. See id. Finally, the Court disposed of 
petitioners' third challenge and held that the Attorney General's delegation of 
his temporary scheduling power to the DEA was constitutional because Con-
gress did not limit the Attorney General's delegation authority in the Act. See 
id. at 169. 
137. Compare id. at 165 (finding that "imminent hazard to the public safety" was an 
"intelligible principle"), with A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (noting that codes of fair competition failed to pro-
vide guidance to the President), and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
407 (1935) (concluding that the statute authorizing the President "to pre-
scribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of Title I of the [NlRA]" lacked sufficient guidance). 
138. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 76. 
139. [d. 
140. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
534 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices."141 While 
the nondelegation doctrine may ring hollow, the Court has not 
abandoned its scrutiny of administrative agencies. 
In fact, the void created by the impotence of the nondelegation 
doctrine has been filled by the development of other protective 
mechanisms. 142 First, courts now strive to place substantive limita-
tions on over-broad, vague, or standard-less laws. 143 Second, courts 
require "reasoned consistency" in agency decisionmaking. l44 The fi-
nal mechanism imposed by federal courts is the use of procedural 
safeguards to protect against abuses of discretion. 145 Nevertheless, 
no matter how many procedures an agency employs during its 
rulemaking process, if the power is conveyed in an unconditional 
delegation of Congress's lawmaking function, the statute cannot be 
cured. 146 
D. Nondelegation Analysis Through Statutory Construction 
Another prevalent method courts employ to avoid invalidating 
a statute on nondelegation grounds is the canon of judicial re-
straint. 147 This canon requires a court to abstain from basing its rul- . 
ing on constitutional grounds if another non-constitutional basis for 
the decision exists. 148 By invoking the canon of judicial restraint, a 
141. [d. at 865. 
142. See STEIN ET AL, supra note 100, § 3.03[1], at 3-97 to 3-99. 
143. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that absent explicit 
authority to deny passports to citizens based on "their beliefs or associations," 
the Secretary of State could "not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' 
right of free movement"). 
144. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 
1669, 1679 (1975). 
145. See id. at 1679. 
146. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, § 1.4, at 37. 
147. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157-58 (1984); see 
also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) ("This canon is followed out of 
respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional 
limitations."); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (" [W]here an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the 
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construc-
tion is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); Industrial Union Dep't v. 
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (reasoning that it is more 
favorable to construe a statute to avoid finding a "sweeping delegation of leg-
islative power"); 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 12.11[3], at 162-63. 
148. See Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 157-58; see also American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 
at 646; 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 12.11[3], at 162-63. 
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court can resolve a challenge asserted under the non delegation doc-
trine by applying a narrow construction to the enabling statute to 
void the specific regulation promulgated by the agency.149 The court 
avoids the constitutional issue by holding that the regulation 
promulgated by the agency exceeded the power conferred to it by 
the enabling statute. 150 Instead of rendering the entire enabling stat-
ute unconstitutional, the court strikes only the particular agency 
power asserted. 151 This method of analysis enables a court to curtail 
excessive agency power, but on statutory construction grounds. 152 
Often the enabling statute at issue is broad and the agency 
could reasonably interpret it to permit the regulation adopted. 153 
The claimant challenging the delegation will assert that the power 
conveyed was overly broad and violative of the nondelegation doc-
trine. 154 A reviewing court will then proceed through traditional ca-
nons of statutory construction. 155 Assuming Congress intended that 
the agency could promulgate the regulation at issue, the court will 
decide whether allowing this construction would violate the 
nondelegation doctrine. 156 If upholding the regulation would violate 
the nondelegation doctrine, the court will infer that Congress 
would not have intended to delegate the particular power in-
volved. 157 Accordingly, the court will conclude that the agency went 
beyond the scope of its enabling act. 158 
It would behoove a litigant to juxtapose any non delegation doc-
trine challenge with the canon of judicial restraint. By itself, the 
nondelegation doctrine will rarely provide a basis for a court to pre-
149. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 
12.11 [3], at 162-63. 
150. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 
12.11[3], at 162-63. 
151. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646 (narrowing the statutory language so as 
to avoid violating the non delegation doctrine); see also 3 Koch, supra note 50, 
§ 12.13[5], at 179-80. 
152. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 
12.13[5], at 180. 
153. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-91 (1991); American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 
64041. 
154. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, at 20 (citing NBC v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190, 211-U (1943». 
155. See id. at 15 (citing American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 607). 
156. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 639-40; National Cable Television Assoc. v. 
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342-44 (1974). 
157. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 645; National Cable Television, 415 U.S. at 343-
44. 
158. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 663-64. 
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vent an agency from exercising broad rule making power. 159 When 
combined with a statutory construction analysis premised upon the 
canon of judicial restraint, however, the nondelegation doctrine re-
mains a viable method of curtailing broad delegations of power to 
agencies. 160 In essence, the principles behind the non delegation 
doctrine are now employed to infer congressional intent. 161 
III. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
State constitutions contain three types of separation of powers 
provisions. 162 Twenty-seven state constitutions, including Mary-
land's,163 contain the most restrictive type of separation of powers 
clause. l64 These restrictive separation of power clauses include an 
express separation of powers provision coupled with an additional 
clause that explicidy prohibits "any person belonging to or exercis-
ing power under any branch from . . . exercising any power or 
function belonging to another."165 Twelve state constitutions contain 
separation of powers provisions expressly stating that the govern-
mental powers shall be separate. 166 Ten state constitutions resemble 
the provisions in the United States Constitution and implicidy incor-
porate the separation of powers provision by establishing three 
branches of government and according each branch specific 
powers. 167 
The various separation of powers provisions have led to differ-
ing approaches to non delegation issues by state courts. One com-
159. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text. 
16l. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
162. See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Leg-
islators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. 
REv. 1205, 1236-37 (1993). 
163. Maryland's separation of powers provision provides: "That the Legislative, Ex-
ecutive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and 
distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of 
said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." MD. 
CODE ANN., CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 8 (1998). 
164. See Devlin, supra note 162, at 1237. 
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Louisiana's state constitution is similar 
to these twenty-seven states in that it contains an express separation of powers 
provision and an additional limiting clause. See id. at 1237 & n.1l2. Louisiana's 
limiting clause provides that "no one of these branches, nor any person hold-
ing office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the 
others." Id. at n.1l2. 
166. See id. at 1236. 
167. See id. 
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mentator has identified three categories of nondelegation doctrine 
approaches. 168 The first category consists of states with the strictest 
non delegation doctrine jurisprudence-delegations of legislative 
power must be accompanied by "strict" standards and safeguards. 169 
This rule requires that statutes contain definite and clear standards 
to control the agency's decision making process. 170 There are eigh-
teen states that subscribe to this view. 171 
States in the second category-the "loose" standard and safe-
guard category-require their legislatures to set forth general rules 
in their enabling statutes in order to curtail agency discretion. 172 
These jurisdictions require guiding principles to take the form of ei-
ther general legislative standards or procedural safeguards, or a 
combination of both.173 Twenty-four states apply these general 
requirements. 174 
168. See Gary J. Greco, Survey, Standards (Yf Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doc-
trine in the States, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 567, 579-80 (1994). The author cataloged 
not only the standards that each state applies, but the cases adopting the stan-
dards requirement. See id. 
169. See id. at 580. The author notes that the requirement of standards and safe-
guards is based on a policy that the legislature should not avoid its political 
responsibility by delegating its lawmaking authority. See id. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. at 581-84 (citing Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19 
(Fla. 1978) (requiring a statute to provide strict standards); Guillou v. Division 
of Motor Vehicles, 503 A.2d 838, 84042 (N.H. 1986) (requiring a statute to 
provide a general policy and prescribe specific standards); Boreali v. Axelrod, 
517 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (N.Y 1987) (requiring a statute to provide reasonable 
safeguards and standards); Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Ratchford, 416 
N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ohio 1980) (requiring a statute to provide practical stan-
dards or an "intelligible principle"); Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 
784 (Pa. 1987) (Papadikos, J., concurring) (requiring a statute to provide lim-
its on an agency's powers and establish procedures to govern their decision-
making); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 89 S.E.2d 337, 342 (Va. 1955) (requiring 
that a statute fIx a standard to guide the agency in rulemaking); State ex reL 
Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 631 (W. Va. 1981) (requiring that a statute 
must provide sufficient standards for guidance». 
172. See id. at 588. 
173. See id. 
174. See id. at 588-92 (citing Connecticut v. Campbell, 617 A.2d 889, 895 (Conn. 
1992) (requiring that standards be as defInite as is reasonably practical under 
the circumstances); Atlantis I Condominium Ass'n v. Bryson, 403 A.2d 711, 713 
(Del. 1979) (noting that a court will focus on totality of protections against ar-
bitrariness including both standards and safeguards); Department of Transp. v. 
City of Atlanta, 398 S.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ga. 1990) (noting that legislature must 
provide sufficient guidelines); People v. Turmon, 340 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich. 
1983) (requiring that statutes provide standards that are as reasonably precise 
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The final category is the procedural safeguard category.175 
Under the procedural safeguards test, courts focus on whether the 
legislature has created procedural safeguards in determining 
whether the enabling statute was an unconstitutional delegation of 
power. 176 States in this category grant their administrative agencies 
wide discretion in determining policy and writing regulations. 177 
There are six states that subscribe to the procedural safeguards re-
quirement. 178 The commentator that set forth these categories iden-
tified Maryland as falling within this procedural safeguards cate-
gory.179 The following analysis illustrates the present state of the 
nondelegation doctrine in Maryland. 
A. Maryland Administrative Law 
Until Lussier, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had addressed 
essentially two primary issues in cases concerning the extent of 
power the Maryland General Assembly bestowed on administrative 
agencies under broad statutory grants of authority.180 The first issue 
was whether the Maryland General Assembly could constitutionally 
delegate its power. 181 The second issue involved a statutory construc-
tion analysis that was aimed at determining the extent of power the 
General Assembly actually intended to convey to the agency.182 Both 
as the subject matter permits); Township of Mount Laurel v. Department of 
Pub. Advocate, 416 A.2d 886, 891 (NJ. 1980) (requiring that statutes contain 
sufficient standards); Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural Resources, 249 
S.E.2d 402, 410-11 (N.C. 1978) (noting that if the legislature provides general 
policies or guidelines, detailed standards are not necessary». 
175. See id. at 598. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. at 598-99 (citing People v. Wright, 639 P.2d 267, 271 (Cal. 1982) (noting 
that reasonable grants of powers to agencies are permissible so long as suita-
ble safeguards are established); Meyer v. Lord, 586 P.2d 367, 371 (Or. Ct. App. 
1978) (noting that the determining factor for ruling on the constitutionality 
of a delegation is whether adequate administrative safeguards exist); Barry & 
Barry, Inc. v. State, 500 P.2d 540, 54243 (Wash. 1972) (noting that the statute 
should contain a general standard advising the agency of what to do and must 
provide adequate procedural safeguards». 
179. See id. at 598-99 (citing Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 532 
A.2d 1056 (1987». 
180. See infra notes 192-395 and accompanying text. 
181. For a discussion of Maryland cases addressing constitutional issues, see infra 
notes 192-262 and accompanying text. 
182. For a discussion of Maryland cases addressing statutory construction issues, 
see infra notes 276-395 and accompanying text. 
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categories of issues are explored in the following subsections. 
1. Separation of Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine III 
Maryland 
While Maryland is not bound by the doctrine of separation of 
powers that has developed under the federal Constitution,183 
Maryland courts have articulated analogous principles. Article 8 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that "the Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever 
separate."I84 Thus, unlike the federal Constitution, Maryland's Con-
stitution contains an explicit reference to the separation of pow-
ers.185 Any delegation of legislative or judicial power to an adminis-
trative agency appears to contradict Article 8 because, in theory, 
administrative agencies fall under the executive branch. 186 Nonethe-
less, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized the right of 
the General Assembly to delegate legislative powers to administra-
tive agencies for over 125 years. 187 As the court of appeals has con-
strued Article 8, the separation of powers doctrine does not act as a 
complete bar to the transfer of power among the three branches of 
government. 188 
183. See Richard A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in the State Separation of 
Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 79. 79 (1998) ("State courts 
clearly have the power to diverge from federal doctrine in construing their 
states' constitutions .... "). 
184. MD. CODE ANN., CaNST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 8 (1998). 
185. See Maryland State Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 480, 
624 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1993) (distinguishing the explicit reference to the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine in Maryland's Constitution from the implicitly rec-
ognized doctrine in the federal Constitution). 
186. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 702-03, 648 A.2d 804, 
814 (1996) (Bell, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Bell noted that the abil-
ity to promulgate a regulation imposing a fine is a legislative function. See id. 
at 702, 648 A.2d at 814 (Bell, j., dissenting). The ability to impose the fine is a 
judicial function. See id. (Bell j., dissenting). However, the delegation was not 
unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers bar between the exec-
utive and the judiciary because the enabling statute provided for judicial re-
view of the punishment. See id. at 707, 684 A.2d at 817 (Bell, j., dissenting). 
187. See id. at 706, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell, j., dissenting); see also Harrison v. Mayor 
of Baltimore, 1 Gill 264, 276-77 (1843) (noting that, by incorporating the 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, "the corporate authorities were clothed 
with all the legislative powers which the General Assembly could have ex-
erted"). 
188. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 706, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell, j., dissenting) (citing Depart-
ment of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 
220,334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975». 
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As with the federal courts, Maryland courts have adopted and 
developed their own non delegation doctrine jurisprudence that reg-
ulates the transfer of power from the General Assembly to adminis-
trative agencies. 189 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has aptly rec-
ognized that "[ t] he delegation doctrine . . . is a corollary of the 
separation of powers doctrine."19o Thus, Maryland's nondelegation 
doctrine curtails violations of Maryland's constitutional separation of 
powers doctrine. 191 
a. The Adequate Legislative Standards Requirement 
Originally, Maryland courts required the General Assembly to 
provide adequate legislative standards in all enabling statutes in or-
der to prevent arbitrary enforcement by administrative agencies. l92 
Early courts recognized that legislative standards were necessary "be-
cause the omission to prescribe reasonably definite standards for 
the exercise of such an authority might result in arbitrary discrimi-
nations."193 Therefore, analogous to the federal precedent discussed 
in Section II, the initial inquiry in a nondelegation doctrine chal-
lenge in Maryland focuses on the legislative standards supplied by 
the General Assembly in the particular enabling statute at issue. 194 
However, early Maryland case law began to erode this strict stan-
dards requirement. 
189. See Warwick, 330 Md. at 480,624 A.2d at 1241 (explaining that "[t]he delega-
tion doctrine prohibits a legislative body from delegating its law-making func-
tion to any other branch of government or entity and is a corollary of the sep-
aration of powers doctrine implicit in the United States Constitution and 
expressly provided in the Maryland Constitution"). 
190. Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 77, 532 A.2d 1056, 1062 
(1987). 
191. In Maryland, the separation of powers provision requires that legislative and 
executive authority must be separate. See MD. CODE ANN., CaNST., DECLARATION 
OF RIGHTS art. 8 (1998). This provision acts as a bar to the sharing of power 
between branches, unless the judiciary creates an exception. 
192. See, e.g., Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 69-70, 81 A.2d 226, 229 (1951) (ad-
dressing the sufficiency of legislative standards to survive constitutional scru-
tiny); Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaff, Inc., 149 Md. 648, 656, 132 A. 160, 164-
65 (1926) (considering whether "unfit for human food" was an adequate stan-
dard). 
193. County Comm'rs of Prince George's County v. Northwest Cemetery Co., 160 
Md. 653, 656, 154 A. 452, 453 (1931) (invalidating a statute conferring unbri-
dled discretion upon county commissioners to permit or proscribe the estab-
lishment of a cemetery). 
194. See supra notes 64-{j9 and accompanying text. 
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h. Areas in Which the Legislative Standards Requirement Has Eroded 
In Givner v. Commissioner of Health,195 the court of appeals re-
laxed the requirement for a legislative standard when a statute con-
ferred powers relating to areas of public health. 196 In Givner, a land-
lord brought suit against the Commissioner of Health of Baltimore 
City seeking a decree declaring unconstitutional a regulation con-
cerning bathing facilities in dwelling units. 197 
The issue was whether the enabling legislation was sufficiently 
definite as "to guide the [agency] in ascertaining the basic facts 
upon which [its] regulations were predicated."198 The Givner court 
began its analysis by documenting areas of administrative law where 
the nondelegation doctrine had been relaxed such as zoning, rede-
velopment, and public health cases. 199 As with these areas, the court 
of appeals concluded that a statute enabling an agency to regulate 
the area of "public health" should be treated more liberally by 
courts engaging in a constitutional non delegation doctrine analy-
sis.2OO The court explained that agencies regulating the area of pub-
lic health should be accorded broader quasi-legislative discretion be-
cause "there is a practical necessity for expert interpretation in its 
application to concrete situations.''201 The court, however, did not 
provide a specific test for determining if a particular legislative stan-
dard provided enough guidance to survive a non delegation doctrine 
challenge. 
c. The Safeguards Component 
Early Maryland precedent emphasized the legislative standards 
requirement-powers delegated to an administrative agency must 
195. 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955). 
196. See id. at 184, 113 A.2d at 899. 
197. See id. at 187-90, 113 A.2d at 900-01. 
198. [d. at 191, 113 A.2d at 902. 
199. See id. The court noted that the trend of administrative law cases allowing re-
laxed standards started with zoning cases. See id. The court pointed to Heath v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 303, 49 A.2d 799, 803 (1946), and Montgomery 
County v. Mcrlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 287, 96 A.2d 261, 264 (1953), to support 
this proposition. The court also noted a trend to loosen the standards require-
ment in both redevelopment cases and public health cases. See Givncr, 207 Md. 
at 191-92, 113 A.2d at 902-03. 
200. See Givncr, 207 Md. at 192, 113 A.2d at 902. The statute at issue directed the 
Commissioner of Health to " 'cause all ordinances for the preservation of the 
health of the inhabitants of Baltimore City to be faithfully executed and 
strictly observed.' " [d. at 189, 113 A.2d at 901. 
201. [d. at 191, 113 A.2d at 902. 
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contain adequate legislative standards to prevent an abuse of discre-
tion.202 As case law developed, however, so did the court's inquiry. 
Specifically, courts added an alternative "safeguard" component to 
the legislative standards test.203 This legislative safeguards compo-
nent was similar to the standards test in that it required the legisla-
ture to provide safeguards to prevent arbitrary enforcement by ad-
ministrative agencies. 204 Later, Maryland courts apparently merged 
the legislative safeguards test with the legislative standards test.205 
Thus, the inquiry evolved from determining whether the legislative 
standards exist, to determining whether legislative safeguards or 
standards exist.206 Under the legislative safeguards or standards test, 
if the enabling legislation creates either sufficient standards or suffi-
cient safeguards, it will be upheld.207 The following two cases 
demonstrate how the Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied the 
legislative standards or safeguards test. 
In County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding 
Corp.,208 the court of appeals articulated the legislative standards or 
safeguards test and struck down as unconstitutional a portion of a 
statute authorizing a county commissioner to issue fines up to 
$1000.209 A group of landlords sought to invalidate an administrative 
202. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
203. See Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 383, 24 A.2d 911, 915 
(1942) ("The usual rule with respect to delegations of ... power to adminis-
trative [agencies is that they] must be surrounded with such safeguards that 
the [agency] cannot [act] arbitrarily."). While the safeguards component be-
gan to surface in early cases, it was not until County Council for Montgomery 
County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 255 (1973), that the 
court of appeals articulated the safeguards component as a distinct alternative 
to the standards component. See infra note 206. 
204. This test is not to be confused with the procedural safeguards that an agency 
may choose to implement on its own initiative. For a discussion of those self-
imposed procedural safeguards, see infra notes 356-59 and accompanying text. 
205. See infra notes 208-38 and accompanying text. 
206. Compare Givner, 207 Md. at 191, 113 A.2d at 902 ("The fact that the promulga-
tion of regulations involves the exercise of discretion and deliberation of a 
type that might be described as legislative in character, is not necessarily fatal, 
provided there are adequate standards set up .... "), with Investors Funding, 
270 Md. at 442, 312 A.2d at 246 ("We hold here that because of the complete 
lack of any safeguards or standards, the grant of unlimited discretion ... is il-
legal."). 
207. See infra notes 208-38 and accompanying text. 
208. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973). 
209. See id. at 441-42, 312 A.2d at 246. The statute stated, in pertinent part, that 
among the powers conveyed was the power to enforce the provisions of the 
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regulation, alleging that the enabling legislation that was enacted by 
the Montgomery County Council violated the state and federal con-
stitutions.210 The landlords asserted, inter alia, that the power to fine 
which the County Council granted to the Commission on Landlord-
Tenant Affairs was an improper delegation of the power.211 
The court of appeals inquired whether the Council's delegation 
of the power to fine was constitutional.212 The court's analysis in In-
vestor's Funding turned on whether adequate legislative safeguards or 
standards existed.213 The court first noted that the legislature had 
specifically granted the administrative agency the authority to im-
pose fines up to $1000 for a violation of any provision of the stat-
ute. 214 The court recognized the general liberality in the trend of 
cases that has permitted broad grants of discretion to administrative 
officials justified by the need "to facilitate the administration of the 
laws as the complexity of the governmental and economic condi-
tions increase [d]. "215 
The court explained that a valid delegation of legislative au-
thority to an administrative agency must be accompanied by suffi-
cient legislative safeguards or standards to prevent a violation of 
both the separation of powers provision and due process.216 The 
court noted that "[n] 0 meaningful judicial review of the Commis-
sion's assessment of such penalties would appear possible in light of 
the unrestricted nature of the discretion sought to be vested in the 
Act: 
through any appropriate means; including but not limited to ... (ii) 
the imposition of a civil penalty, not in excess of $1,000, for the viola-
tion of any provision of this Chapter, (iii) the imposition of an award 
of money damages against a landlord or tenant for the benefit of ei-
ther as may be provided for in this Chapter. 
[d. at 408, 312 A.2d at 228. 
210. See id. at 406, 312 A.2d at 227-33. 
211. See id. at 441,312 A.2d at 246. 
212. See id. at 440-41, 312 A.2d at 245-46. There was no need for the court to in-
quire whether the power was actually delegated because the legislature specifi-
cally delegated the power to fine. See id. The court further indicated that the 
power to fine may be constitutionally delegated by the legislature. See id. at 
441, 312 A.2d at 246. Therefore, the administrative agency was not legislating, 
per se, when it imposed a fine because the legislature had specifically dele-
gated the authority. 
213. See id. at 441-42, 312 A.2d at 246. 
214. See id. at 441, 312 A.2d at 246. 
215. [d. at 442, 312 A.2d at 246. 
216. See id. 
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Commission. "217 The Investor's Funding court concluded that the un-
limited discretion to impose a fine "up to $1000 without regard to 
the nature or gravity of the violation ... constitute[d] an invalid 
delegation of legislative powers and otherwise violate[d] due pro-
cess of law requirements."218 
Recently, in Christ v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources,219 
the court of appeals addressed a broad grant of power by the Gen-
eral Assembly to the Department of Natural Resources.22o The ena-
bling statute at issue granted the Department the power to "adopt 
regulations governing the 'operations of any vessels' which are sub-
ject to the Act."221 Pursuant to this grant of power, the Department 
issued a regulation222 that prohibited persons under the age of four-
teen from operating personal watercraft on Maryland waterways.223 
Charles R. Christ sought declaratory relief on behalf of his minor 
son, challenging the Department's regulation. 224 Christ challenged 
the constitutionality of the power asserted under the delegation 
doctrine225 and whether the Department properly executed its pow-
ers as they were conferred by the enabling legislation.226 
The court of appeals rejected Christ's argument that the ena-
bling legislation violated the separation of powers principle.227 The 
court explained that the separation of powers principle does not act 
217. [d. 
218. [d. at 441, 312 A.2d at 246. The court concluded that the agency's power to 
fine had a "total absence of any legislative safeguards." [d. However, the con-
curring opinion aptly recognized that the delegated power at issue was judicial 
in nature, rather than legislative. See id. at 459-60, 312 A.2d at 255 (Barnes, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
219. 335 Md. 427, 644 A.2d 34 (1994). 
220. See id. at 431-32, 644 A.2d at 35-36. 
221. [d. at 437, 644 A.2d at 39. 
222. The regulation at issue in Christ was COMAR 08.18.02.05A. See id. at 431 n.l, 
644 A.2d at 35 n.1. This regulation provided that" [a] person may not lease, 
hire, rent, operate, or give permission to operate a personal watercraft unless 
the operator is 14 years old or older." [d. at 433, 644 A.2d at 36. 
223. The statutory grant relied on by the Department of Natural Resources to 
adopt the regulation at issue was section 8-704 of the Natural Resources Arti-
cle which provided that "[ t] he Departmen t may adopt regulations necessary 
to carry out the provisions of the subtitle." /d. at 432 n.2, 644 A.2d at 36 n.2. 
224. See id. at 433, 644 A.2d at 36. 
225. See id. at 441-45, 644 A.2d at 40-42. 
226. See id. at 437-40, 644 A.2d at 38-39. For a discussion of the statutory construc-
tion analysis employed by the Christ court, see infra notes 276-97 and accompa-
nying text. 
227. See Christ, 335 Md. at 445, 644 A.2d at 42. 
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as a complete bar between the branches of government.228 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that the delegation of legislative power to an 
executive agency will not violate the separation of power principle 
when the regulation is accompanied by "guidelines or safeguards, 
sufficient under the circumstances, [and] contained in the perti-
nent statute or statutes. "229 
The court concluded, in this instance, that the enabling legisla-
tion did not create a constitutional violation of the separation of 
powers principle because adequate legislative safeguards were pres-
ent. 230 For example, the department could not present any pro-
posed legislation "without first soliciting the advice and opinions of 
public officials and representatives of specified types of organiza-
tions. "231 Further safeguards included the requirements of "notice, 
public comments and public hearings. "232 
Additionally, Christ maintained that, "a fundamental policy 
making decision," may not be constitutionally delegated by the leg-
228. See id. at 441, 644 A.2d at 40. 
229. Id.; see also Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 263, 627 A.2d 1039, 1051 (1993) (de-
termining that the governor's statutory authority to reduce budget appropria-
tions by up to twenty-five percent did not violate separation of powers because 
the limitations on the governor's exercise of authority provided sufficient safe-
guards); Maryland State Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 
480-81, 624 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1993) (determining that a Board of Public 
Works's regulation was consistent with its enabling statute and did not violate 
the separation of powers bar); Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 
64, 72, 532 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1987) (importing standards from a federal pro-
gram to validate a state program). The Christ court noted that the require-
ment of legislative safeguards had been relaxed in prior decisions. See Christ, 
335 Md. at 441, 644 A.2d at 40 (citing Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555, 
121 A.2d 816, 822 (1956». 
230. See Christ, 335 Md. at 445, 644 A.2d at 42. Quoting Pressman, which acts as an 
exception to the standards or safeguards requirement, the court stated the re-
quirement for guidelines is not absolute "where the discretion to be exercised 
relates to ... regulations for the protection of public morals, health, safety, or 
general welfare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without destroying the 
flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officials to carry out the legis-
lative will." Id. at 44142, 644 A.2d at 4041; see also Judy, 331 Md. at 263-64, 627 
A.2d at 1051-52. The court, however, did not reach the Pressman analysis noted 
above because there were adequate legislative safeguards within the enabling 
legislation. See Christ, 335 Md. at 44344, 644 A.2d at 42. For a discussion of the 
exception to the legislative standards or safeguards requirement developed in 
Pressman, see infra notes 239-62 and accompanying text. 
231. Christ, 335 Md. at 443, 644 A.2d at 41. 
232. Id. at 444, 644 A.2d at 42. 
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islature to the executive branch.233 This type of fundamental poli-
cymaking argument has proven convincing to one Supreme Court 
Justice234 and the court of appeals agreed that "the General Assem-
bly cannot constitutionally delegate to another body its 'fundamen-
tal decision making authority' in the sense that it cannot delegate a 
function which the Constitution expressly and unqualifiedly vests in 
the General Assembly itself."235 The court intimated, however, that 
fundamental decisionmaking authority is a narrowly limited concept 
that includes such acts as the power to impeach, propose constitu-
tional amendments, or to enact statutes.236 The Christ court opined 
that prior decisions of the court of appeals have "repeatedly upheld 
the constitutionality of administrative regulations reflecting policy 
determinations which have been just as 'fundamental' as the age re-
striction" set forth in the regulation at issue.237 Thus, the court held 
the legislature may authorize administrative agencies with a broad 
grant of power to promulgate legislative-type rules such as those at 
issue.238 Christ does not represent the high-water mark for the court 
of appeals's liberalization of the nondelegation doctrine. Several de-
cades before Christ, the court of appeals began to carve out an ex-
ception to the legislative standards requirement. 
d. The Impracticability Exception to the Legislative Standards or Safeguard 
Requirement 
In Pressman v. Barnes,239 the court of appeals created the first 
true exception to the legislative standards requirement for areas in-
volving police regulations of public safety.240 In Pressman, taxpayers 
brought suit against the Director of Traffic, the Mayor, and the City 
Council of Baltimore241 alleging that the municipal corporation im-
233. Id. Christ relied on opinions of the Supreme Court of California. See id. (cit-
ing People v. Wright, 639 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1982); KnIgler v. Yocum, 445 P.2d 303, 
306 (Cal. 1968». 
234. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 
(1980) (Rehnquist, j., concurring) ("When fundamental policy decisions un-
derlying important legislation about to be enacted are to be made, the buck 
stops with Congress and the President insofar as he exercises his constitutional 
role in the legislative process."). 
235. Christ, 335 Md. at 444, 644 A.2d at 42. 
236. See id. at 444-45, 644 A.2d at 42. 
237. Id. at 445, 644 A.2d at 42. 
238. See id. 
239. 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956). 
240. See id. at 555, 121 A.2d at 822. 
241. The ordinance at issue gave the Mayor of Baltimore the power to appoint the 
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properly delegated the power to regulate the speed limits on cer-
tain streets in Baltimore City to the Director.242 Plaintiffs argued, in-
ter alia, that this delegation of power violated the separation of 
powers provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.243 
The Pressman court first noted that" [i] t is a fundamental prin-
ciple that, except when authorized by the Constitution, the Legisla-
ture cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other author-
ity. "244 Citing the separation of powers provision, the court 
explained that generally, any attempt to abdicate legislative author-
ity is unconstitutiona1.245 However, the court went on to note that 
the separation of powers provision is not violated when a municipal 
corporation is vested with legislative powers as to local concerns if 
the legislature provided standards for restraint and guidance.246 
Thus, the Pressman court acknowledged that the delegation of 
Director of Traffic. See id. at 549, 121 A.2d at 819. The case repeatedly refers 
to this delegation of power as a delegation to the Mayor and the City Council. 
This Note refers to the two parties collectively as the "municipal corporation." 
242. See id. at 549-50, 121 A.2d at 819. 
243. See id. at 552, 121 A.2d at 820. The municipal corporation delegated the 
power to set speed limits to the Director. See id. at 549-52, 121 A.2d at 819-20. 
The taxpayers argued, inter alia, that the legislative function of setting speed 
limits could not lawfully be delegated by the municipal corporation to the Di-
rector. See id. at 549, 121 A.2d at 819-20. The issue turned on whether execu-
tive officers, the municipal corporation, could sulHlelegate their legislative au-
thority to a lower level executive, the Director. See id. at 552-54, 121 A.2d at 
820-21. However, the standards established in Pressman have been applied to 
determine the validity of delegations of power by the legislative branch to ad-
ministrative agencies as well. See, e.g., County Council for Montgomery County 
v. Investor's Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 441, 312 A.2d 225, 246 (1973) (ren-
dering a delegation by the legislature to an agency invalid because it lacked 
legislative safeguards or standards). 
244. Pressman, 209 Md. at 552, 121 A.2d at 820. 
245. See id. 
246. See id. The court stated that the same constitutional restrictions bind a munici-
pal corporation and the legislature. See id. The court also noted that a munici-
pal corporation may sulHlelegate powers to subordinate officials in order to 
carry out ordinances. See id. Although this delegation requires the exercise of 
discretion by the subordinate officer, the court explained that this discretion 
can fairly be considered part of the police power of the executive branch. See 
id. The court cited Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 A. 465 (1926), in sup-
port of the proposition that this discretion is constitutional if accompanied by 
sufficient legislative safeguards to avoid arbitrary and unreasonable exercises 
of power. See id.; see also County Comm'rs of Prince George's County v. North-
west Cemetery Co., 160 Md. 653, 656, 154 A. 452, 453 (1931) (voiding a statute 
that provides county commissioners with unregulated discretion to allow or 
prevent the establishment or maintenance of cemeteries). 
548 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
power to Baltimore City, a municipal corporation, to regulate local 
traffic was appropriate.247 
The Pressman court then considered whether the power to regu-
late speed limits could be sub-delegated by the municipal corpora-
tion.248 The court explained that the same type of legislative stan-
dards inquiry applies when a municipal corporation sub-delegates 
legislative powers to local administrative agencies.249 The power del-
egated by the legislature that was sub-delegated by the municipal 
corporation related to a matter of public safety.250 The Pressman 
court noted that prior decisions had lowered standards in delega-
tion cases in areas such as zoning251 and public health252 and rea-
soned that delegations in the area of public safety should be at least 
as flexible as in the area of public health.253 
Mter identifying the general trend towards liberally applying 
the nondelegation doctrine to areas of public health, safety,. and 
welfare, the Pressman court analyzed whether the municipality's ordi-
nance set forth adequate legislative standards to prevent arbitrary 
enforcement by the Director.254 Normally, a delegation of power 
must contain standards to guide the exercise of power.255 However, 
the ordinance that enabled the Director of Traffic to create speed 
limits contained no standards.256 Thus, the Pressman court was 
forced to decide that the statute violated the nondelegation doc-
trine because it lacked adequate legislative standards or require an 
exception to the legislative standards requirement. 
247. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 554, 121 A.2d at 821. 
248. See id. at 552-53, 121 A.2d at 820-21. 
249. See id. at 552, 121 A.2d at 820. 
250. See id. at 553, 121 A.2d at 821. 
251. See Tighe, 150 Md. at 457-58, 133 A. at 467 (1926) (holding that the Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore may delegate to the Zoning Commissioner the abil-
ity to determine whether the proposed use of buildings would interfere with 
public security, health, or morals). 
252. See Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 191, 113 A.2d 899, 902 
(1955) (noting that more flexible standards are permitted in public health 
than in zoning). 
253. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 553, 121 A.2d at 821. 
254. See id. at 554-55, 121 A.2d at 821. Typically, these standards must be provided 
to prevent arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power by the administrative 
agency beyond the proper scope of the police power. See id. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. at 550, 121 A.2d at 819 (citing section 2 of the ordinance that empow-
ered the Director and listed such powers). Through its analysis, the Pressman 
court indicated that no standards were specifically listed in the ordinance. See 
id. at 55~, 121 A.2d at 822. 
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The court held that when the discretion to be exercised relates 
"to police regulations for the protection of public morals, health, 
safety, or general welfare," the regulation could be valid absent any 
standards, but only if it was impracticable for the legislature to fix 
these standards without destroying the flexibility· necessary to carry 
out the legislative intent.257 Thus, in considering this issue, the Press-
man court established an impracticability exception to the general 
rule that prevents delegations without standards or safeguards.258 
The Pressman court concluded that the statute at issue did not 
contain restrictions to prevent abuse, but fell within the impractica-
bility exception.259 The court held that under a public safety ratio-
nale, the municipal corporation lawfully delegated the power to set 
speed limits on the streets of Baltimore to the Director without any 
legislative standards or safeguards.260 The court reasoned that it was 
impossible for the legislature to prescribe restrictive guidelines for 
traffic regulation because traffic regulation was so complex.261 Thus, 
under the limited exception established in Pressman, a standard-less 
delegation may be valid in situations in which it would be impracti-
cable to set standards without destroying the flexibility necessary to 
enable administrative officials to carry out the legislature's intent.262 
. These cases illustrate two levels of inquiry that Maryland courts 
will engage in when determining a nondelegation issue. Under In-
vestor's Funding, when a court determines the validity of a broad 
grant of power to an administrative agency, the court must consider 
whether there were adequate standards or safeguards provided by 
the legislature.263 If there are no standards or safeguards for gui-
257. Id. The court explained: 
[g]enerally, a statute or ordinance vesting discretion in admini~trative 
officials without fixing any standards for their guidance is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power. But we also hold, as a qual-
ification of the general rule, that where the discretion to be exer-
cised relates to police regulations for the protection of public morals, 
health, safety, or general welfare, and it is impracticable to fix stan-
dards without destroying the flexibility necessary to enable the ad-
ministrative officials to carry out the legislative will, legislation dele-
gating such discretion without such restrictions may be valid. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
258. See id. 
259. See id. at 554-55, 121 A.2d at 821-22. 
260. See id. at 554, 121 A.2d at 821. 
261. See id. at 553, 555, 121 A.2d at 821-22. 
262. See id. at 555, 121 A.2d at 822. 
263. See supra text accompanying note 213. 
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dance, a regulation must be held invalid unless it falls within the 
Pressman exception-when standards would be impracticable to 
set.264 Under Christ, if either of these tests are met, the administra-
tive agency may promulgate regulations that are consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the enabling statute.265 Determining what is 
within the letter and spirit of an enabling statute requires a court to 
perform a statutory construction analysis.266 Section IV of this Note 
highlights a few canons of statutory construction that courts often 
utilize in the administrative law context in deciphering the legisla-
ture's intent. 
IV. MARYLAND'S RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
As noted, broad statutory delegations of administrative regula-
tory authority are often challenged on constitutional grounds. 267 
Claimants often argue that the non delegation doctrine is violated 
when a legislative body assigns its "lawmaking function" to an ad-
ministrative agency.268 However, broad delegations of power are 
rarely voided under the nondelegation doctrine.269 Maryland courts 
have recognized that the legislature is often unable to anticipate 
every specific grant of power to promulgate each necessary regula-
tion as "it is manifestly impracticable for the legislature to set spe-
cific guidelines to govern the day-to-day exercise of rulemaking 
power."270 
More frequently, courts focus on whether the power exercised 
by the agency was impermissibly expanded beyond the intent of the 
legislature.271 Therefore, a challenge to an agency's exercise of 
264. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
265. See infra notes 284-97 and accompanying text. 
266. See infra notes 276-97 and accompanying text. 
267. See Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 322 Md. 409, 415-18, 588 A.2d 
324, 327-28 (1991) (challenging the Workmen's Compensation Commission's 
discretion to disapprove fees for medical services rendered in excess of Com-
mission guidelines); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 440-
41, 370 A.2d 1102, 1119 (1979), afi'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute proscribing petroleum producers or refiners from 
selling petroleum products at retail outlets). 
268. See, e.g., Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956). 
269. For a discussion of the liberalization of the nondelegation doctrine by Mary-
land courts, see supra notes 195-262 and accompanying text. 
270. Sullivan v. Board of License Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 123, 442 A.2d 558, 563 
(1982) . 
271. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 557, 121 A.2d at 823; see also Falik, 322 Md. at 417,588 
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power often requires the reviewing court to apply canons of statu-
tory construction to the enabling legislation to determine whether 
the legislature has actually conveyed the specific power sought to be 
exercised by the agency.272 The primary purpose of this statutory 
construction analysis is to carry out the legislature's intent. 273 If the 
legislature delegates enumerated powers to an agency, and the 
agency's action extends beyond the reach of the specifically dele-
gated power, then that action may be invalidated by a court.274 How-
ever, Maryland courts extend substantial deference to legislative de-
cisions to delegate a broad grant of power to administrative 
agencies.275 
Christ v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources-76 is illustrative 
of the general deference courts will accord an agency attempting to 
carry out the intent of the legislature.277 In addition to the constitu-
tional challenge previously discussed,278 the court of appeals held 
that a broad grant of power under an enabling statute permitted 
the Department of Natural Resources to promulgate a regulation 
prohibiting children under the age of fourteen from operating per-
sonal watercraft.279 Christ argued that the statute280 did not provide 
the administrative agency with the power to promulgate a regula-
tion281 that would prevent persons under a certain age from operat-
A.2d at 328. 
272. For a discussion of the application of a statutory construction analysis to de-
termine what was included under a broad legislative grant of authority, see in-
fra notes 336-55 and accompanying text. 
273. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 684, 
393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978) (citing Mazor v. State Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 
355, 369 A.2d 82 (1977». 
274. See Brzowski v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n, 114 Md. App. 615, 
626,691 A.2d 699, 704 (1997). 
275. See SuUivan, 293 Md. at 122, 442 A.2d at 563 (observing that the court of ap-
peals has "upheld broad delegations of legislative power to administrative 
agencies" in a long line of cases). 
276. 335 Md. 427, 644 A.2d 34 (1994). 
277. See id. at 431, 644 A.2d at 35 (resolving a declaratory judgment action brought 
to challenge a Department of Natural Resources regulation prohibiting the 
operation of personal watercraft by a person under the age of 14). 
278. For a discussion of the constitutional challenge considered in Christ, see supra 
notes 219-38 and accompanying text. 
279. See Christ, 335 Md. at 443, 644 A.2d at 41. 
280. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. I. § 8-704 (Supp. 1997). The statute notes that, 
" [t] he Department may adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this subtitle." Id. 
281. The Department promulgated a regulation in the Code of Maryland Regula-
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ing watercraft.282 The court of appeals disagreed.283 
The Christ court noted that its prior decisions generally upheld 
administrative agency rules or regulations "as long as they did not 
contradict the language or purpose of the statute."284 Christ asserted 
that the Department contradicted the purpose of the enabling stat-
ute by "prohibit[ing] the use of vessels by an entire class of citizens 
of the State. "285 The court suggested that Christ's reading of the 
purpose of the statute was unduly narrow.286 The court opined that 
the legislature's grant of power to the agency was purposefully 
broad.287 The court concluded, "[i]n any particular area of legisla-
tive concern, whether there should be a broad general delegation 
of regulatory authority to administrators, or a more specific delega-
tion, is a choice for the General Assembly."288 
The thrust of the plaintiff'S argument was that the Depart-
ment's mission, as enunciated in the Department's enabling statute, 
was to promote boat safety and education.289 As such, completely 
prohibiting youngsters from operating boats was inconsistent with 
this mission.290 The plaintiff reasoned that this inconsistency existed 
because the State Boat Act evinced an "overall spirit" to educate 
young boaters as opposed to prohibit them from operating certain 
vessels.291 
The court stated that the General Assembly need not specifi-
cally delegate the power to prevent a class of persons from operat-
ing watercraft. 292 The court noted that "[ t] he broad authority to 
promulgate 'regulations governing the ... operations of any vessels' 
tions, which provided: "A person may not lease, hire, rent, operate, or give 
permission to operate a personal watercraft unless: (1) the operator is 14 years 
old or older .... " COMAR 08.18.02.05A. 
282. See Christ, 335 Md. at 433-34, 644 A.2d at 36-37. 
283. See id. at 437, 644 A.2d at 39. 
284. Id. at 438, 644 A.2d at 39. 
285. Id. at 439, 644 A.2d at 39. 
286. See id. 
287. See id. 
288. Id. 
289. See id. at 437, 644 A.2d at 38. The State Boat Act directs the Department to 
" [p 1 romote the safety of life and property through an educational program 
directed to boat· owners, boat operators, and others concerning the inherent 
hazards of vessels." MD. CODE ANN .. NAT. REs. I § 8-703(a)(2) (1990 & Supp. 
1993) . 
290. See Christ, 335 Md. at 437, 644 A.2d at 38. 
291. See id. 
292. See id. 
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plainly encompasses a regulation prohibiting the operation of cer-
tain motor vessels by persons under 14. "293 The court's conclusion 
was supported by cases in which it previously held that it would be 
impracticable for the legislature to set specific guidelines to govern 
the day-to-day exercise of rulemaking power. 294 
The court agreed that the legislative intent behind the ena-
bling statute was to promote boating safety.295 However, the court 
held that the agency's regulation restricting the age of boat opera-
tors was "a reasonable regulation to promote the statutory purpose 
of boating safety."296 Thus, the Christ court held that the regulation 
at issue was promulgated pursuant to a broad grant of power, and 
therefore could include age restrictions because it would be imprac-
ticable for the legislature to have to deal with the complex issues of 
boating safe ty. 297 
While Christ illustrates the deference accorded by the courts to 
administrative agencies, an agency's power in not unlimited. For ex-
ample, in Pressman, after resolving the constitutional issue,298 the 
court conducted a thorough statutory construction analysis299 of an 
enabling statute that conferred power to the City of Baltimore. The 
Pressman court examined whether an enabling statute passed by the 
293. Id. 
294. See id.; see also Falik v. Prince George's Hosp., 322 Md. 40.9, 417, 588 A.2d 324, 
328 (1991); Sullivan v. Board of License Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 122-23, 442 
A.2d 558, 563 (1982); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 441, 
370. A.2d 110.2, 1119 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
295. See Christ, 335 Md. at 443, 644 A.2d at 41. 
296. Id. 
297. See id. at 43941, 644 A.2d 3940.. 
298. For a discussion of the Pressman court's constitutional inquiry, see supra text 
accompanying notes 239-62. 
299. See Pressman v. Barnes, 20.9 Md. 544, 558-59, 121 A.2d 816, 823-24 (1956). The 
Pressman court noted that in determining the legislative intent of an enact-
ment, a court should consider the language used by the legislature in its natu-
ral and ordinary sense. See id. at 558, 121 A.2d at 823. If no ambiguity exists, 
applying the canons of statutory construction is unnecessary. See id. If the 
words used are ambiguous on their face, their meanings may be expanded or 
contracted to harmonize the language of the statute with the legislature's in-
tent if that intent can be ascertained by the construction. See id. The meaning 
of the words depends on the history of the statute and its objectives. See id. at 
558-59, 121 A.2d at 823; see also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
385, 395-96 (1867) (noting that penal statutes are to be construed strictly and 
intent is to be gathered from the words used in context); Norfolk & Ports-
mouth Traction Co. v. Ellington's Admiral, 61 S.E. 779, 782 (Va. 190.8) (relying 
on context and "remedy in view" in interpreting an ambiguous statute). 
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Maryland General Assembly that allowed the City of Baltimore to 
regulate any road within the city's limits, except for extensions of 
state roads, included the power to regulate roads within the city 
marked as state roads.30o Baltimore's City Council delegated the 
power to the Director of Traffic.301 In turn, the Director of Traffic 
posted speed limits on roads within the city's boundaries. 302 Mter 
the Pressman court determined that the delegation of power to the 
City Council did not violate the separation of powers doctrine,303 it 
addressed whether the Director of Traffic's administrative regulation 
was within the domain of powers conferred by the General 
Assembly.304 
The City argued that the ordinance passed by the Director did 
not affect any streets that were "designated or maintained as a part 
of the State or Federal highway system or an extension thereof."305 
The City reasoned that the ordinance was lawful because the City 
did not exceed the lawmaking power given to it by the General As-
sembly.306 Although the taxpayers conceded that the state did not 
maintain the roads at issue, they argued that many of the city 
streets were "part of the State highway system or at least extensions 
of that system. "307 Therefore, the taxpayers asserted that the exercise 
of power by the city over these streets exceeded the power given to 
it by the state legislature.308 
The court's interpretation of the statute necessarily focused on 
whether the streets at issue were considered "extensions" of state 
highways.309 The court first noted that the cardinal rule of statutory 
300. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 557, 121 A.2d at 823. The statute stated in relevant 
part: 
Id. 
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the appropriate 
authorities of any incorporated city . . . are authorized . . . to regu-
late the speed of vehicles on any road ... which is within their re-
spective corporate limits and which has not been designated or main-
tained as a part of the State or Federal highway system or an 
extension thereof. 
301. See id. at 549, 121 A.2d at 819. 
302. See id. 
303. See id. at 554, 121 A.2d at 821. 
304. See id. at 557-61, 121 A.2d at 823-24. 
305. Id. at 557, 121 A.2d at 823. 
306. See id. 
307. Id. at 557-58, 121 A.2d at 823. 
308. See id. 
309. See id. at 559, 121 A.2d at 824. 
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construction is that statutes should always be construed to carry out 
the legislature's intent.31O The court further stated that in cases of 
ambiguity, the proper course of construction is to adopt the mean-
ing that best harmonizes with the context of the statute and pro-
motes the policies and objectives of the legislature.311 
The Pressman court considered the meaning of "extension" and 
noted that it is a flexible term that lends "itself to a variety of mean-
ings."312 The court reasoned that because the meaning of the word 
extension was flexible, it had to be ascertained within the context of 
the particular factual situation.313 The Pressman court analyzed "ex-
tension" in the context of city streets that were continuations of the 
State highway system.314 The court highlighted the fact that the 
streets at issue, despite being within city limits, were clearly marked 
with state road signs "erected by the State Roads Commission."315 In 
light of the broad meaning of the word extension, in conjunction 
with the state road signs, the court held that the regulation of these 
roads by the state was beyond the power conferred to it by the stat-
ute.316 Therefore, the Director of Traffic was enjoined from posting 
speed limits on these roads because the city never had the power to 
grant the Director the authority to do so.317 
The Pressman court's analysis illustrates a commonly asserted al-
ternative ground on which to challenge a delegation of power to an 
agency when a nondelegation doctrine argument fails.318 While Ma-
ryland cases indicate that the courts are willing to accord substantial 
deference to agency rulemaking pursuant to broad statutory grants 
of power, it would be inaccurate to conclude that litigants challeng-
ing an agency's power are left without canons in their arsenal. Sub-
section A elaborates on the primary canons of construction that ap-
ply to the administrative law context. 
A. Three Primary Methods of Determining Legislative Intent 
Ordinarily, an administrative remedy must be invoked before 
310. See id. at 558, 121 A.2d at 823. 
311. See id. at 558-59,121 A.2d at 823. 
312. Id. at 559, 121 A.2d at 824. 
313. See id. 
314. See id. 
315. Id. at 559-60, 121 A.2d at 824. 
316. See id. at 560, 121 A.2d at 824. 
317. See id. 
318. See id. 
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resorting to an independent judicial remedy.319 Mter a party ex-
hausts its administrative remedies, it may seek judicial relief on the 
grounds that the agency's construction of the enabling statute was 
erroneous. When construing a statute in the administrative law con-
text, courts will apply the traditional canons of statutory construc-
tion.32o In addition to traditional canons of statutory construction, 
there are several unique canons of construction that apply to ad-
ministrative law decisions.321 
Courts often examine three factors when trying to determine 
the legislature's intent with respect to determining the scope of 
power granted to an agency under an enabling act. The primary 
factor courts look to is the construction that the administrative 
agency placed on the statute shortly after it was passed.322 This con-
struction often has a "strong, persuasive influence" on a court's 
overall interpretation.323 Additionally, courts will look to the nature 
of the process that led to the agency's interpretation. The second 
factor courts consider is the Attorney General's interpretation of the 
statute.324 Courts will presume that the legislature is aware of an At-
319. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 
25, 511 A.2d 1079, 1091 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff must invoke and ex-
haust his administrative remedies before maintaining an action in court). 
320. See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.02. at 312 
(5th ed. 1992) ("The usual rules of statutory construction are controlling for 
the purpose of determining what administrative powers, rights, privileges and 
immunities are granted."). 
321. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 685-
86, 393 A.2d 181, 185 (1978). 
322. See Demory Bros. v. Board of Pub. Works, 20 Md. 467, 473, 316 A.2d 529, 532 
(1974). 
323. Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185; see also Farber's, Inc., v. Comptrol-
ler of the Treasury, 266 Md. 44, 50-51, 291 A.2d 658, 661-62 (1972) (explaining 
that an administrative construction of a statute applied shortly after the enact-
ment of the statute should not be disregarded "except for the strongest and 
most cogent reasons," while rules and regulations adopted by administrative 
agencies must be reasonable and consistent with the letter and policy of the 
statute under which the agency acts); F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Comp-
troller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 211, 218, 257 A.2d 416, 419 (1969) (illustrating 
an argument made by the Comptroller that his construction of the statute 
should be strongly persuasive and influential on the judicial construction of 
the statute). On the federal level, broad judicial deference is given to an 
agency's construction of a statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984) (explaining that judi-
cial deference must be accorded to an agency's construction of a statute). 
324. See Demory Bros., 20 Md. at 473, 316 A.2d at 532. 
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torney General's interpretation.325 The final factor courts look to is 
the legislative history of the statute, particularly the presence or ab-
sence of legislative amendments which would support or exempt an 
agency's interpretation.326 
1. The Agency's Construction of the Statute 
Statutory construction is a judicial function.327 However, courts 
will consider an agency's interpretation of an enabling statute when 
deciphering the legislature's intent.328 If the statutory language in 
question is ambiguous, a long-standing administrative interpretation 
may be given weight. 329 Indeed, Maryland courts have gone so far as 
to hold that an agency's interpretation "should not be disregarded 
except for the strongest and most urgent reason."330 
In particular, a long-standing administrative interpretation that 
was established immediately or shortly after the enabling act passed 
and that continued uniformly thereafter gives rise to a strong pre-
sumption that the interpretation is correct. 331 Courts will construe 
an absence of legislative amendments as indicative of a continuous 
325. See id. 
326. See id. 
327. See Mitchell v. Register of Wills, 227 Md. 305, 311, 176 A.2d 763, 766 (1962) 
(holding that the Maryland General Assembly acquiesced in an administrative 
agency's construction of a statue where the General Assembly had ample time 
to amend it and did nothing). 
328. See Commission on Human Relations v. Baltimore County, 46 Md. App. 45, 58, 
415 A.2d 856, 863 (1980). 
329. See Macke Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 264 Md. 121, 134, 285 
A.2d 593, 599-600 (1972) (giving great weight to twenty-five year administrative 
interpretation of a statute); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Greyhound 
Corp., 247 Md. 662, 669, 234 A.2d 255, 258 (1967) (noting that an administra-
tive interpretation is accorded "great weight by the courts"). 
330. Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 685, 393 
A.2d 181, 185 (1978). 
331. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 161, 501 
A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986) (noting that an agency charged with the administra-
tion of a statute is entitled to great deference in its interpretation, especially 
when the interpretation has been consistently applied for a long period of 
time); National Asphalt Pavement Assoc. v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 
75, 80, 437 A.2d 651, 653 (1981) (noting that a consistent construction of a 
statute by an administrative agency responsible for administering the statute is 
entitled to considerable weight); Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685-86, 393 A.2d at 
185; see also Board of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 
(1982) (noting that an agency's interpretation of a statute more than a half of 
a century after its enactment is not long-standing). 
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acquiescence to the administrative construction.332 Legislative acqui-
escence to the administrative construction of the statute will be 
deemed to have occurred when the legislature had "ample time to 
amend it," but remained silent.333 Thus, Maryland courts, in effect, 
use the agency's construction to infer legislative intent. 
When the statutory language is unambiguous, an administrative 
interpretation that directly conflicts with its plain meaning will not 
be given weight, even if the interpretation was long-standing.334 
Moreover, little or no weight will be given to an administrative in-
terpretation of a statute if an agency has inconsistently interpreted 
the statute or has failed to enforce the statute in accordance with 
the agency's own interpretation.335 An illustrative example of an 
agency's inconsistent interpretation of its enabling statute and its ef-
fect on a court's statutory construction analysis is Holy Cross Hospital 
v. Health Services Cost Review Commission. 336 
In Holy Cross, the court of appeals was called on to interpret a 
broad statutory grant of power by the Maryland General Assembly 
to the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission.337 The 
broad enabling legislation granted the Commission the power to 
332. See Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685, 393 A.2d at 181. 
333. Id. When the administrative agency responsible for administering the statute 
has made its interpretation known to the legislature in agency reports, it is en-
titled to great weight. See Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 322 Md. 
409, 416, 588 A.2d 324, 327 (1991) (noting that considerable weight should be 
given to an administrative construction of a statute when the legislature was 
aware of the interpretation in the agency's reports). 
334. See Falik, 322 Md. at 416, 588 A.2d at 327 (" [W]hen the statutory language is 
unambiguous, administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, 
are not given weight."); Lendo, 295 Md. at 63, 453 A.2d at 1189 (noting that 
"[n]o custom, however venerable, can nullify the plain meaning and purpose 
of a statute"); Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185; City of Hagerstown 
v. Long Meadow Shopping Ctr., 264 Md. 481, 493, 287 A.2d 242, 248 (1972) 
(noting that adherence to the rule of deference to long-standing administra-
tive interpretation is conditional upon the enabling statute being ambiguous); 
Shapiro v. City of Baltimore, 230 Md. 199, 216, 186 A.2d 605, 615 (1962) (not-
ing that no custom, no matter how long it has been followed by administrative 
officials, can nullify the plain meaning and purpose of the statute). 
335. See Comptroller of the Treasury v.John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 545, 404 
A.2d 1045, 1056 (1979); 2B SINGER, supra note 320, § 49.05, at 18 ("[W]eight 
given to an agency interpretation depends on many factors including . . . its 
consistency with earlier and later agency pronouncements."). 
336. 283 Md. 677, 393 A.2d 181 (1978). 
337. See id. at 679, 393 A.2d at 182. 
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regulate hospital charges.338 The central issue was whether the Com-
mission's act of setting physicians' fees went beyond the scope of 
power granted to the Commission by its enabling legislation.339 
Under the enabling act, the Commission was granted quasi-leg-
islative powers.340 Specifically, the enabling act at issue granted the 
Commission the power to regulate the "total costs of the hospital" 
and to "review and approve the reasonableness of rates established 
or requested by any hospital. "341 The Commission established physi-
cians' fees in the specialties of cardiology, pathology, and 
radiology.342 
The Commission was of the opinion that this act fell within its 
authority to regulate the total costs of the hospital. 343 Holy Cross 
Hospital challenged the regulation, arguing that the contested phy-
sicians' fees were not part of the total costs of the hospital; there-
fore, the Commission exceeded its authority under the enabling 
act.344 In an attempt to discern whether the total costs of the hospi-
tal included the contested physicians' fees345 the Holy Cross court ap-
338. See id. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184. 
339. See id. at 679, 393 A.2d at 182. The statute in Holy Cross stated that the Com-
mission had the power to " [e]xercise, subject to the limitations and restric-
tions herein imposed, all other powers which are reasonably necessary or es-
sential to carry out the expressed objects and purposes of this subtitle." Id. at 
680 n.l, 393 A.2d at 182 n.l (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 568M(3) (1971 & 
Supp. 1978». 
340. The Commission's powers were quasi-legislative in nature because the Com-
mission could establish hospital rates in accordance with the enabling act. See 
id. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184. Under the enabling act, =the hospital's aggre-
gate rates [had to be] reasonably related to the hospital's aggregate costs.'" Id. 
at 682, 393 A.2d at 184 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 568U(a) (1971 & 
Supp. 1978». 
341. Id. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184. 
342. See id. at 679, 393 A.2d at 182. The Commission believed that it had the au-
thority to regulate the rates charged in cardiology, pathology, and radiology 
because those specialties involved services of the hospital and the Commission 
had the authority to concern itself with all costs associated with the services 
rendered to patients in the hospital. See id. at 680, 393 A.2d at 182-83. 
343. See id. 
344. See id. at 681, 393 A.2d at 183. 
345. See id. at 684-89, 393 A.2d at 184-87. The statute specified: 
[T] he Commission shall have the power to initiate such reviews or in-
vestigations as may be necessary to assure all purchasers of health 
care hospital services that the total costs of the hospital are reasona-
bly related to the total services offered by the hospital, [and] that the 
hospital's aggregate rates are reasonably related to the hospital'S ag-
gregate costs . . . . In order to properly discharge these obligations, 
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plied several general principles of statutory construction.346 
The Court determined that several possible meanings of the 
term existed.347 As such, the statutory language was deemed ambigu-
OUS,348 a finding which permitted the court to place weight on the 
agency's interpretation.349 However, no long-standing administrative 
interpretation of the enabling act existed because the Commission 
had reversed its position on its authority to establish physicians' 
fees. 35o 
When the enabling act was first passed, the Commission had in-
terpreted the setting of physicians' fees to be outside its scope of 
the Commission shall have full power to review and approve the rea-
sonableness of rates established or requested by any hospital subject 
to the provisions of this subtitle. 
[d. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 568U (1971 & 
Supp. 1978». 
346. The court stated a litany of traditional statutory construction principles: 
As we have so often said, the cardinal rule of construction of a stat-
ute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature. 
The primary source from which we glean this intention is the lan-
guage of the statute itself. And in construing a statute we accord the 
words their ordinary and natural signification. If reasonably possible, 
a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause, or sentence is 
rendered surplusage or meaningless. Similarly, wherever possible an 
interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not 
lead to absurd consequences. Moreover, if the statute is part of the 
general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read to-
gether to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature. 
[d. at 684, 393 A.2d at 184-85 (citations omitted). 
However, the court recognized that "construing a statute liberally and ad-
ding to it, by judicial fiat, a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to 
include are not one and the same thing." [d. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185 (quoting 
Harden v. Maryland Transit Auth., 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817, 821 
(1976». The court stated that the legislature'S intent was to provide for ad-
ministrative review of hospital charges to insure that the total costs of the hos-
pital were reasonably related to the total services offered by the hospital. See 
id. at 687, 393 A.2d at 186. 
347. The court concluded that "total costs of the hospital means the Hospital's ex-
penditures or outlays of money in connection with the operation of the Hos-
pital." [d. at 689, 393 A.2d at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
court noted that when the statute was enacted, the term "total costs of the 
hospital" may have been considered a "term of art in the health care field 
having a well understood meaning different from its common signification 
which would include the fees of the physicians here." [d. 
348. See id. at 687-89, 393 A.2d at 186-87. 
349. See id. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185. 
350. See id. at 685-86, 393 A.2d at 185. 
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authority under the act. 351 Several years later, the Commission 
changed its position and asserted that it had the authority to set 
physicians' fees.352 Thus, the Commission's inconsistent interpreta-
tion was a factor the court considered in assessing what weight to 
give the Commission's interpretation.353 
Applying this principle of statutory construction, the Holy Cross 
court intimated that the Commission's current interpretation of the 
enabling act would not have persuasive influence on the court's 
construction of the statute.354 The Holy Cross court, however, was un-
able to determine whether the fees charged by the physicians were 
part of the total costs of the hospital due to lack of evidence· in the 
trial court record and remanded the case.355 
a. The Procedures Employed by the Agency in Reaching Its Interpretation 
Although the procedures employed by an agency in arriving at 
its interpretation do not rise to the level of more traditional canons 
of statutory construction, they are relevant in assessing the weight 
accorded the agency's interpretation.356 For example, when the 
agency's interpretation of a statute is the result of (1) the agency 
"focus[ing] its attention on the statutory provisions in question, (2) 
thoroughly address[ing] the relevant issues, and (3) reach[ing] its 
interpretation through a sound reasoning process," then that inter-
pretation is given deference by the courts.357 However, if the 
agency's interpretation does not arise out of contested adversarial 
proceedings or formal rule procedure, the court is not likely to find 
351. See id. 
352. See id. 
353. See id. 
354. See id. The court explained: 
[T]he view taken of a statute by administrative officials soon after its 
passage is strong, persuasive influence in determining the judicial 
construction and should not be disregarded except for the strongest 
and most urgent reasons .... Even if sufficient time had passed since 
enactment of the statute here under consideration for administrative 
interpretation of it to be regarded as long-standing, no such interpre-
tation exists here because the Commission has reversed its position. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
355. See id. at 689-90, 393 A.2d at 187. 
356. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 162, 501 
A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986) (holding that an administrative agency's interpretation 
of its enabling statute was to be given weight because it was the product of 
contested proceedings). 
357. Id. at 161-62, 501 A.2d at 1315. 
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it persuasive.358 Additionally, it can be asserted that if the legislature 
delegates excessive lawmaking powers, no amount of administrative 
procedure that an agency institutes will cure a nondelegation doc-
trine violation.359 
2. Attorney General Opinions 
As the state's chief counsel,360 the Attorney General of Mary-
land has a tremendous impact on administrative law. It is the consti-
tutional duty of the attorney general to represent the state when it 
is brought before an administrative agency361 and to represent the 
state administrative agencies before the courts.362 Another duty of 
the attorney general is to interpret the meaning of an administra-
tive agency's enabling statute and reduce it to a written advisory 
opinion for all interested parties.363 In turn, agencies often rely on 
these attorney general opinions in executing the power granted to 
them under the enabling statute.364 
The attorney general advisory opinions are often relied on by 
courts when interpreting ambiguous language in an administrative 
agency's enabling statute.365 As with other extraneous authority, 
courts will only look to attorney general advisory opinions when 
358. See id; Comptroller v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 544, 404 A.2d 1045, 
1056 (1979). 
359. Cf supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
360. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 6-106(b) (1998); State ex reL Attorney Gen. 
v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 301 Md. 9, 34, 481 A.2d 785, 797 (1984). 
361. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5, § 3(a)(1) (1981). 
362. See id. § 3(a)(2). 
363. Notably, this power is one for attorneys general, but not for the courts. Com-
pare Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 
27, 120 A.2d 195, 199 (1956) (refusing to issue an advisory opinion "to the 
Legislature or anyone else"), and Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 46, 464 A.2d 
1076,1078 (1983), with MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5, § 3(a)(4) (1981) (requir-
ing the attorney general to "[gl ive his opinion in writing whenever required 
by the General Assembly or either branch thereof, the Governor, the Comp-
troller, the Treasury or any State's Attorney on any legal matter or subject"). 
364. See Mitchell v. Register of Wills, 227 Md. 305, 310, 176 A.2d 763, 766 (1962) 
(noting that attorney general opinions are "entitled to careful consideration 
and serve as important guides to those charged with the administration of the 
law"); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-107(b) (1995) ("Unless a pro-
posed regulation is submitted to the Attorney General . . . for approval as to 
legality, the regulation: (1) may not be adopted under any statutory authority; 
and (2) if adopted, is not effective."). 
365. See Bouze v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 687, 26 A.2d 767, 769 (1942). 
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statutory language is ambiguous.366 Even when the enabling statute 
is ambiguous, attorney general advisory opinions do not bind 
courts.367 Courts that do rely on these advisory opinions do so 
under the rule of contemporaneous construction.368 
The rule of contemporaneous construction is a rule of statutory 
construction that enables a court to draw inferences of legislative in-
tent.369 When an attorney general has issued an advisory opinion on 
a particular matter and the legislature has failed to react to this 
opinion through a legislative amendment, a court may consider this 
acquiescence to the opinion.370 According to the court of appeals: 
[W] hen the meaning of the legislative language is not en-
tirely clear, such legal interpretation and administrative con-
struction should be given great consideration in determin-
ing the legislative intent. The Legislature knew, or must be 
presumed to know, of this interpretation and administrative 
construction at the time of [a law's passage] and must be 
held to have employed the language it did with that inter-
pretation in viewY) 
Even if legislative acquiescence can be inferred through the 
rule of contemporaneous construction, the courts are the final arbi-
ter of the law and are always free to disagree with an attorney gen-
eral's opinion.372 This is particularly true when an attorney general 
issues inconsistent opinions on the same matter or when the court 
deems the interpretation incorrect.373 Even when an attorney gen-
eral opinion has been consistently applied and the legislature has 
366. See Schmidt v. Beneficial Finance Co., 285 Md. 148, 158, 400 A.2d 1124, 1129 
(1979); Falcone v. Palmer Ford, 242 Md. 487,494, 219 A.2d 808, 810-11 (1966); 
Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769. 
367. See Schmidt, 285 Md. at 158, 400 A.2d at 1129; Falcone, 242 Md. at 494, 219 A.2d 
at 810-11; Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769. 
368. See Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769. 
369. See Read Drug & Chern. Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 257, 166 A. 742, 745 
(1933). 
370. See State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Found., Inc., 330 Md. 460, 470, 624 A.2d 
955,960 (1993); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 64748, 227 A.2d 
8, 13 (1967). 
371. Read Drug & Chem. Co., 165 Md. at 161, 501 A. at 745. 
372. See Crescent Cities, 330 Md. at 470, 624 A.2d at 960; Schmidt, 285 Md. at 158, 400 
A.2d at 1129; Falcone, 242 Md. at 493-94, 219 A.2d at 810; Read Drug & Chern. 
Co., 165 Md. at 257, 166 A. at 745. 
373. See Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769 (noting inconsistent rulings between 
successive attorneys general in finding a lack of persuasiveness). 
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amended a statute, but failed to address the attorney general's opin-
ion, the rule of contemporaneous construction can fail. 374 
For example, in response to the contention that the rule of 
contemporaneous construction "should not be disregarded except 
on the most imperative ground," the court of appeals once pro-
claimed: "The imperative ground here is that we do not agree with 
the conclusion reached by the Attorney General. "375 Thus, while at-
torney general advisory opinions have some significance in adminis-
trative law, courts are always free to disagree. 
3. Legislative History of the Statute and the Agency 
The legislative history of the statute, as well as the history of 
the agency itself, will be considered in deciphering legislative intent. 
Gutwein v. Easton Publishing CO.,376 provides an illustrative example of 
how courts deal with legislative history in the administrative law 
context. In Gutwein, the court of appeals held that an administrative 
agency could not award compensatory damages without explicit au-
thority in the agency's enabling statute.377 
In Gutwein, Easton Publishing allegedly discharged Paul D. 
Gutwein in violation of an anti-discrimination law.378 The legislature 
originally charged the Human Relations Commission with the duty 
to investigate any allegations of discrimination "and to take such af-
firmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the particular sub-
title."379 Upon investigating Gutwein's discharge, the Commission 
374. See, e.g., Schmidt, 285 Md. at 158, 400 A.2d at 1129. 
375. [d. 
376. 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974). 
377. See id. at 576-77, 325 A.2d at 747. 
378. See id. at 565, 325 A.2d at 741. The statute violated by Easton provided: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (a) To 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, creed, sex, age or national origin. 
Id. at 565-66, 325 A.2d at 741. 
379. [d. at 565, 325 A.2d at 741. The statute provides in pertinent part: 
[T]he Commission shall hold a public hearing ... [and] "[i]f upon 
all the evidence, the Commission finds that the respondent has en-
gaged in any discriminatory act within the scope of any of these sub-
titles, it shall so state its findings. The Commission thereupon shall is-
sue and cause to be served upon the respondent an order requiring 
the respondent to cease and desist from the discriminatory acts and 
to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the 
particular subtitle." 
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found that Easton Publishing discriminated against Gutwein, a white 
male, because his fiancee was black.380 The Commission awarded 
Gutwein six weeks lost pay and moving expenses as compensatory 
damages.38I 
Following the award of compensatory damages to Gutwein, Eas-
ton Publishing appealed to the Circuit Court for Talbot County.382 
The circuit court reversed the Commission's award of compensatory 
damages after concluding that Gutwein failed to prove any 
redressable injury.383 The Commission and Gutwein appealed the 
circuit court's decision.384 The court of appeals determined that the 
Commission's finding that a redressable injury had occurred 
"should have been accepted by the circuit court."385 
However, before allowing the Commission's award to stand, the 
court of appeals addressed whether the Commission even had the 
power to award compensatory damages.386 The enabling statute did 
not explicitly authorize the Commission to award compensatory 
damages. 387 Gutwein and the Commission asserted that the agency's 
authority to order affirmative action was analogous to state and fed-
eral civil rights laws, which have been "interpreted 'expansively' to 
permit the payment of compensatory damages to victims of discrimi-
nation. "388 Mter examining the assertedly analogous federal and 
state civil rights cases, the court of appeals concluded that no court 
has construed the "bare words affirmative action as will effectuate 
the purposes of the statute, ... to authorize a monetary award. "389 
In rendering its opinion, the court of appeals focused on the 
legislative background of the Commission to determine whether the 
Maryland General Assembly conferred the power to award compen-
satory damages.39o The court found that although the Commission's 
powers have changed throughout time, for the first thirty-five years 
of its existence, the Commission possessed no enforcement powers 
[d. (citation omitted). 
380. See id. 
381. See id. at 566, 325 A.2d at 742. 
382. See id. 
383 .. See id. 
384. See id. 
385. [d. at 567, 325 A.2d at 742. 
386. See id. at 568, 325 A.2d at 743. 
387. See id. at 568-69, 325 A.2d at 743. 
388. [d. at 568, 325 A.2d at 743. 
389. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
390. See id. at 575-76, 325 A.2d at 74647. 
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whatsoever.39I The Commission was granted the power to seek court 
enforcement of its orders only after the state banned racial discrimi-
nation in 1963.392 The court of appeals determined that since 1963, 
the Maryland General Assembly never specifically enlarged the 
Commission's enforcement powers; thus, the Commission had no 
authority to award compensatory or other damages.393 
The Gutwein court concluded that because the legislature did 
not delegate the power to award damages to the Commission, and 
because it would be unlikely that the legislature would intend to 
confer the power to award compensatory damages without adequate 
guidelines or limitations, the agency was not entitled to make any 
monetary awards.394 The court of appeals cautioned "that even when 
the legislature is fairly explicit about the meaning of 'affirmative ac-
tion,' a monetary damage remedy is not to be lightly implied. "395 
While the imposition of a monetary damage award appears to be 
quite analogous to an imposition of a fine, Section V of this Note 
demonstrates that they are apparently considered distinct by the 
court of appeals. 
V. LUSSIER v. MARYLAND RACING COMMISSION 
A. History of the Maryland Racing Commission 
Originally, in Maryland, counties individually regulated horse 
racing.396 Although some counties established commissions to regu-
late racing,397 in most counties the judiciary regulated racing.398 This 
scheme continued virtually unchanged until 1919, when, in Close v. 
Southern Maryland Agriculture Ass'n,399 the court of appeals held that 
judicial regulation of horse racing violated the separation of powers 
391. See id. The Commission's authority was limited to the study and survey of in-
terracial problems and relations. See id. at 576, 325 A.2d at 747. 
392. See id. 
393. See id. 
394. See id. at 576-77, 325 A.2d at 747. The court noted that the statute did not 
speak in terms of remedying the effects of discrimination, but attempted to 
provide a means to halt discrimination. See id. at 568-69, 325 A.2d at 743. The 
court further contrasted this with Title VII claims in which there is a specific 
provision for awarding damages. See id. at 569-70, 325 A.2d at 743-44. 
395. Id. at 574, 325 A.2d at 746. 
396. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 691, 684 A.2d 804, 808 
(1996). 
397. See id. 
398. See id. 
399. 134 Md. 629, 108 A. 209 (1919). 
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principle.4oo 
In Close, a statute enacted by the General Assembly granted 
county circuit courts the power to issue any person a license permit-
ting betting, pool selling, and bookmaking, provided that an appli-
cation was filed and notification given.401 The Close court held that 
the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Maryland's 
Constitution because it conferred non-judicial duties on the 
judiciary.402 
Following the decision in Close, the Maryland General Assembly 
enacted Chapter 273 of the Acts of 1920 that created the Maryland 
Racing Commission (MRC).403 The 1920 statute conferred upon the 
MRC a· broad delegation of power to regulate racing in general.404 
400. See id. at 644, 108 A. at 215 (holding that article 27, sections 217 to 221 of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland violated article 8 of Maryland's Declaration of 
Rights). 
401. See id. at 630, 108 A. at 210. 
402. See id. at 642, 108 A. at 214; see also Lussier, 343 Md. at 691, 684 A.2d at 809. 
The statute required an individual seeking a license to file an application with 
the circuit court that then gave public notice of the application. See Close, 134 
Md. at 635, 108 A. at 212. The court of appeals explained the nature of the 
judicial duties after an application was filed as follows: 
If the petitioner complies with all of the requirements of the statute, 
what is there for the court to try? If it is a valid statute, what sort of 
cause would be sufficient to justifY the court in refusing a license? 
Surely the court, if acting judicially, cannot be governed by the indi-
vidual views of the judges as to betting, or pool selling or bookmak-
ing on horse races. There is nothing in the statute to be determined, 
excepting the name of the applicant, the name of the grounds, a def-
inite description of the place where such grounds are located, 
whether the certificate is signed by at least 25 respectable qualified 
voters of the election district, and the number of days and months 
within which the license shall be operative, even if an order to show 
cause is intended to be passed. All those things can be done by the 
clerk of the court. 
Id. at 642, 108 A. at 214-15. 
403. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 691, 684 A.2d at 809. The statute contained detailed 
provisions relating to licensing and regulating persons conducting horse rac-
ing in Maryland. See id. However, the statute provided that the "Racing Com-
mission shall have full power to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions 
under which all horse-races shall be conducted within the State of Maryland. 
Said Commission may make rules governing, restricting or regulating betting 
on such races." Id. at 692, 684 A.2d at 809 (citing Act of Mar. 31, 1920, ch. 273 
§ 1(11), 1920 MD. LAws 479, 484-85). 
404. The statute broadly stated that the MRC shall have full authority to prescribe 
rules under which all racing shall be conducted including the power to regu-
late any horse race meeting "for purse, stake or reward." Id. 
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Specifically, the 1920 statute granted the MRC explicit authority to 
regulate racetrack owners and operators.405 However, the 1920 stat-
ute did not "expressly authorize the [MRC] to license and regulate 
racehorse owners, trainers [or] jockeys."406 
In 1921, the Attorney General was called upon by the MRC to 
clarify whether the MRC could require trainers and jockeys to be li-
censed.407 The Attorney General concluded that the legislature in-
tended for the licensure of trainers and jockeys to fall within the 
scope of authority granted to the MRC.408 
Shortly thereafter,409 the MRC adopted a regulation pertaining 
not only to licensure, but to the conduct of racehorse owners, train-
ers, and jockeys.410 Since then, the MRC has adopted regulations 
governing racehorse owners, trainers, and jockeys, which, for all in-
tents and purposes, have paralleled the statutory provisions411 en-
acted by the General Assembly that expressly authorize the MRC to 
regulate racetrack owners and operators.412 Among the regulations 
promulgated by the MRC was a provision that granted itself the 
power to suspend or revoke a license, as well as impose a fine on 
any person licensed by the MRC to participate in racing.413 The 
MRC implied that it had the authority to adopt this regulation 
based on the· broad power in its enabling legislation that granted it 
the power to promulgate reasonable rules necessary to regulate all 
matters pertaining to horse racing.414 The regulation allows the 
405. See id. at 694, 684 A.2d at 810. 
406. See id. at 692, 684 A.2d at 809. 
407. See id. 
408. See id. The Attorney General concluded that the General Assembly intended 
to grant "broad and sweeping powers of control and regulation of racing" in 
order to secure clean racing. [d. at 693, 684 A.2d at 810 (citing 6 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 480, 482 (1921». The Attorney General's conclusion was accepted by the 
court of appeals in Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 84-85, 48 A.2d 600, 602 
(1946) (holding that the 1920 act creating the MRC includes the power and 
authority to promulgate reasonable rules to govern the racing of horses, in-
cluding rules governing "the conduct of trainers, jockeys, [and] 
[horse]owners," as well as to "generally regulate all matters pertaining to 
horse racing"). 
409. Lussier, 343 Md. at 695, 684 A.2d at 811. 
410. See COMAR 09.1O.04.03D. These regulations, applicable to owners, jockeys and 
trainers, under COMAR 09.1O.01.01A, provided the MRC with the power to is-
sue fines not exceeding $5000. See id. at 09.1O.04.03D(2). 
411. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 11-308 (1997). 
412. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 695, 684 A.2d at 811. 
413. See COMAR 09.1O.04.03D. 
414. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 11-21O(a) (1) (1997). 
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MRC to punish racehorse owners, jockeys, and trainers engaged in 
specific types of misconduct in a manner parallel to the explicit stat-
utory authority granted to the MRC to punish, suspend, or fine 
racetrack owners and operators.415 Since 1921, the MRC has exer-
cised this regulatory power.416 It was not until Lussier v. Maryland 
Racing Commission that the court of appeals addressed whether this 
statutory grant included the power to fine racehorse owners,417 and 
if so, whether such a grant was constitutional.418 
B. Factual Background 
Frank P. Lussier, a Vermont resident, purchased three horses in 
the spring of 1991.419 Lussier purchased the horses hoping to race 
them and "make some money. "420 Later that year, the horses were 
shipped to Maryland and each horse was entered in a separate race 
at Laurel Race Course.421 
Perfect Reign, the first of these horses to compete, had been 
sold to Woodard Tuttle six days prior to its race.422 Tuttle purchased 
the horse for $5000, despite being told that the horse "might last 20 
starts [or] ... a couple starts. "423 The entry form listed Tuttle as the 
horse's owner and trainer.424 Although Lussier had sold the horse, 
he was present at Laurel Race Course and bet approximately $5400 
on Perfect Reign.425 Perfect Reign won the race; Lussier collected 
$15,000 and subsequently repurchased the horse from Tuttle for 
$6000.426 
Lussier then asked a relatively unknown trainer, Jody Marsh, to 
train his second horse, The Manager.427 Marsh replaced Lussier's 
well-known trainer Michael Downing, who according to Lussier, was 
going to be out of the country on The Manager's race date.428 
415. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 696, 684 A.2d at 811. 
416. See id. at 692-94, 684 A.2d at 809-10. 
417. See id. at 695-97,684 A.2d at 807-D8. 
418. See id. at 700, 684 A.2d at 813. 
419. See id. at 683, 684 A.2d at 805. 
420. Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190, 193, 640 A.2d 259, 
261 (1994), afJ'd, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996). 
421. See id. at 194, 640 A.2d at 261. 
422. See id. 
423. [d. (alteration in original). 
424. See id. 
425. See id. at 195, 640 A.2d at 262. 
426. See id. at 196, 640 A.2d at 262. 
427. See id. at 197, 640 A.2d at 263. 
428. See id. 
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Marsh agreed to train The Manager with no discussion as to salary 
or compensation.429 Marsh was subsequently listed as the horse's 
trainer on the racing forms.43o Lussier bet heavily on his horse, and 
The Manager won the race.431 
Lussier's third horse, High Passer, raced at Laurel Race Course 
on December 31, 1991.432 Lussier sold High Passer four or five days 
prior to the race.433 Again, Lussier appeared at the racetrack and 
bet on the horse.434 High Passer came in third at Laurel Race 
Course.435 Mter the race, the buyer rescinded the sale because of an 
alleged injury High Passer suffered during the race.436 None of the 
horses had ever raced before the events at Laurel Race Course; con-
sequently, race times were not published before their races.437 In-
stead of performance times from previous races, workout times were 
published.438 
The MRC commenced an investigation into these suspect ac-
tions and concluded that Lussier participated in improper acts relat-
ing to racing in violation of COMAR 09.10.01.11A(14) and COMAR 
09.1O.01.25B(8).439 In particular, the MRC found that in each race, 
the information pertaining to workout times and trainers for 
Lussier's horses was falsified or concealed.440 Consequently, the 
MRC imposed a $5000 fine pursuant to COMAR 09.10.04.03D.441 
429. See id. 
430. See id. at 198, 640 A.2d at 263. 
431. See id. 
432. See id. at 199, 640 A.2d at 264. 
433. See id. at 199-200, 640 A.2d at 264. 
434. See id. at 200, 640 A.2d at 264. 
435. See id. 
436. See id. 
437. See id. at 195, 198, 200, 640 A.2d at 262, 263, 264. 
438. See id. Replacing prior race times with workout times was permitted by regula-
tion. See id. at 195, 640 A.2d at 262. 
439. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 684, 684 A.2d 804, 805 
(1996). The MRC concluded that Lussier had violated COMAR 
09.1D.0l.llA(l4) by transferring "two of his horses from himself to the name 
of another person for a purpose other than the legitimate sale of the horses." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The MRC also contended that Lussier 
had conducted dishonest acts in connection with racetrack activities; therefore 
he was charged with violating COMAR 09.1O.01.25B(8). 
440. See id. 
441. See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. COMAR 09.10.04.03D provides: 
D. Denials of Licenses and Sanctions. (1) The Commission may re-
fuse to issue or renew a license, or may suspend or revoke a license 
issued by it, if it finds that the applicant or licensee: (a) Has engaged 
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Lussier filed an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County challenging the administrative decision on several 
grounds.442 The circuit court affirmed the decision of the MRC.443 
Lussier appealed the trial court verdict to the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland, again raising several issues.444 Specifically, Lussier 
challenged the fine imposed by the MRC for his alleged violation of 
MRC regulations.445 
The court of special appeals began its analysis by rebuffing 
Lussier's contention that an administrative agency lacked power to 
fine, absent express statutory authority.446 The court concluded that 
in unethical or criminal conduct; (b) Is associating or consorting 
with an individual who has been convicted of a crime in any jurisdic-
tion; (c) Is consorting or associating with, or has consorted with, a 
bookmaker, tout, or individual of similar pursuits; (d) Is, or has 
been, operating as a bookmaker, tout, or a similar pursuit; (e) Is not 
financially responsible; (f) Has been engaged in, or attempted to en-
gage in, any fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the rac-
ing or breeding of a horse; (g) Assaults, or threatens to do bodily in-
jury to, a member of the Commission or any of its employees or 
representatives or a member or employee of an association; (h) Has 
engaged in conduct detrimental to racing; or (i) Has violated, or at-
tempted to violate: (i) A law or regulation in any jurisdiction, includ-
ing this State, or (ii) A condition imposed by the Commission. (2) 
Instead of, or in addition to, suspending a license, the Commission may im-
pose a fine not exceeding $5,000. (3) In determining the penalty to be 
imposed, the Commission shall consider the: (a) Seriousness of the 
violation; (b) Harm caused by the violation; (c) Good faith or lack of 
good faith of the licensee; and (d) Licensing history of the licensee. 
Id. at n.l (emphasis added). 
442. See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. 
443. See id. 
444. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190,202,640 A.2d 259, 
265 (1994), a/i'd, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996). Lussier raised five issues 
that were addressed by the court of special appeals: (1) that the MRC lacked 
the statutory authority to fine because the statute creating and empowering 
the MRC did not provide express authority to fine; (2) that the MRC disre-
garded its own standards when fining him; (3) that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the MRC's findings; (4) that the MRC regulation was uncon-
stitutionally vague; and (5) that the MRC issued an improper subpoena which 
was illegally enforced. See id. The court rejected each of these arguments and 
affirmed. See id. at 202-21, 640 A.2d at 265-75. 
445. See id. at 193, 640 A.2d at 261. 
446. See id. at 203, 640 A.2d at 266. The court of special appeals stated that 
Lussier's reliance on cases requiring a constitutional inquiry was misplaced. See 
id. The court reasoned that courts applying a constitutional analysis have 
never considered whether an agency possessed the power to impose civil fines 
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the issue turned on whether the power to fine was consistent with 
the purpose of the statute.447 The court reasoned that, in light of 
the legislative history and purpose of the statute, the power to fine 
was implicitly included in the MRC's broad enabling statute.448 The 
court, therefore, rejected each of Lussier's contentions that the 
MRC had no authority to fine him.449 
Lussier appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land arguing, inter alia, that "[d) elegations of legislative power to 
administrative agencies are constitutional only when accompanied 
by [a] 'standard or rule by which that power should be exer-
cised.' "450 The court of appeals granted certiorari to consider 
whether the MRC could impose a fine under its broad empowering 
statute, absent express statutory authority.451 The court held that the 
broad delegation of authority to the MRC included the power to es-
tablish a regulation that authorized it to issue fines.452 
The Lussier court began its examination of the issue by refuting 
Lussier's argument that administrative agencies lack the authority to 
fix penalties absent specific statutory authorization from the legisla-
and that the cases relied upon were therefore irrelevant. See id. Accordingly, 
the court did not make a constitutional inquiry. See id. 
447. See id. at 204, 640 A.2d at 266. The court stated that "a court must examine 
the purpose of the statute creating the agency, its legislative history, and any 
relevant case law to determine whether the legislature intended that the 
agency have the challenged authority." Id. (citations omitted). 
448. See id. at 212, 640 A.2d at 270. 
449. See id. 
450. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 
684 A.2d 804 (1996) (No. 94-96) (citing Electric Pub. Utils. Co. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n, 154 Md. 445, 453, 140 A.2d 840, 843 (1928); Albert v. Public Servo 
Comm., 209 Md. 27, 34, 120 A.2d 346,349 (1956». 
451. See Lussi(ff, 343 Md. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. Lussi(ff quoted section 11-210 of 
the Business Regulation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which pro-
vides in relevant part: 
(a) In generaL-Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
the Commission may: (1) adopt regulations and conditions to govern 
racing and betting on racing in the State ... (b) Prohibited regula-
tions.-The Commission may not adopt regulations that allow: (1) 
racing a breed of horse not now authorized by law; or (2) holding. 
currently unauthorized: (i) intertrack betting; (ii) off-track betting; or 
(iii) telephone betting other than telephone account betting. 
Id. at 687-88, 684 A.2d at 807. The court noted that the statute in question 
provided broad powers to the MRC to adopt regulations to govern racing in 
Maryland and then specifically restricted those powers. See id. at 687, 684 A.2d 
at 807. 
452. See id. at 700, 684 A.2d at 813. 
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ture.453 Lussier's misplaced reliance on Holy Cross in support of this 
proposition was highlighted by the court.454 The court opined that 
Holy Cross addressed whether an administrative agency possessed the 
power to set fees under its broad statutory grant, not whether an 
administrative agency could impose penalties.455 The court ex-
plained that the power to set fees was irrelevant to the argument 
that agencies require express authority to impose fines.456 However, 
the court failed to draw a distinction between the power to set 
fees457 and the power to fine. 
Thereafter, the court examined Lussier's reliance on Gutwein.458 
Lussier argued that, under Gutwein, administrative agencies lack au-
thority to fix penalties without a specific grant of power from the 
legislature.459 The Lussier court distinguished Gutwein as pertaining 
to the power of an administrative agency, in light of its history, to 
make an award of compensatory damages to a victim of discrimina-
tion.460 As Gutwein dealt with neither an agency adopted penalty nor 
a regulation, the court found Lussier's reliance was again 
misplaced.461 
Similarly, the court observed that Lussier's reliance on Investor's 
Funding was misguided.462 The court noted that in Investor's Funding, 
a statute had specifically authorized the agency to impose a fine.463 
According to the Lussier court, the issue in Investor's Funding was 
whether, and under what circumstances, the legislature could con-
stitutionally delegate the authority to impose fines.464 
453. See id. at 685-87, 684 A.2d at 805·.07. 
454. See id. at 685-86, 684 A.2d at 806. Lussier relied on Holy Cross to support his ar-
gument that administrative agencies lack authority to fix penalties absent spe-
cific authority from the legislature. See id. at 685, 684 A.2d at 806. 
455. See id. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. For a discussion of Holy Cross, see supra notes 
336-55 and accompanying text. 
456. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. 
457. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 687, 
393 A.2d 184, 186 (1978) (holding that the agency did not inherently possess 
the power to set physicians' fees). 
458. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. 
459. See id. 
460. For a discussion of Gutwein, see supra notes 376-95 and accompanying text. 
461. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. 
462. See id. Lussier relied on Investor's Funding to bolster his argument that an ad-
ministrative agency lacks the power to fix penalties absent express statutory 
authority. See id. 
463. For a discussion of the statute in Investor's Funding, see supra note 209. 
464. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. 
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The court concluded that when the General Assembly delegates 
broad authority to regulate, the regulations promulgated pursuant 
to the statute are valid if they are consistent with the language or 
purpose of the enabling statute.465 The statute creating the MRC 
contained a broad grant of power from the legislature.466 Mter con-
sidering the language, purpose, and history of the MRC, the court 
determined that the power to fine racehorse owners was consistent 
with the purpose of the enabling statute.467 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Critique of the Court:S Rationale 
The Lussier court devoted the bulk of its attention to an issue 
of statutory construction that was unremarkable. From the record, it 
was clear that the General Assembly intended to permit the MRC to 
impose fines on racehorse owners. The statutory language was am-
biguous inasmuch as it spoke in broad, unspecified terms about the 
MRC's power to regulate racehorse owners.468 Thus, presuming the 
constitutionality of the delegation of power, the court properly 
looked to the canons of statutory construction to determine legisla-
tive intent.469 Looking to the three primary methods courts employ 
to determine legislative intent in the administrative law context,470 
Lussier provides a textbook example in which all three methods bol-
ster the court's conclusion. 
First, the Lussier court properly accorded deference to the 
MRC's construction of its enabling statute.471 From its inception, the 
MRC continuously construed its enabling statute to grant it the 
power to regulate racehorse owners in parallel fashion to racetrack 
owners.472 During the entire history of the MRC, it never wavered 
from the construction it initially placed on the enabling statute.473 
This evinces a long-standing agency construction of its enabling stat-
465. See id. at 688, 684 A.2d at 807. 
466. See id. at 687, 684 A.2d at 807. 
467. See id. at 688-89, 684 A.2d at 808. 
468. See supra notes 403-06 and accompanying text. But see Lussier, 343 Md. at 710, 
684 A.2d at 818 (Bell, J., dissenting) (noting that when the legislature wants to 
grant an agency the power to fine, it knows how to do so explicitly). 
469. See supra note 467 and accompanying text.· 
470. See supra notes 327-35 and accompanying text. 
471. See supra notes 322-26 and accompanying text. 
472. See supra notes 409-16 and accompanying text. 
473. See supra notes 409-16 and accompanying text. 
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ute that a court may properly accord substantial weight.474 
Second, the Attorney General's opinion provides additional 
support for the MRC's exercise of power over racehorse owners.475 
Through the doctrine of contemporaneous construction,476 the 
court of appeals was well within its power to infer legislative acquies-
cence by way of the 1921 Attorney General's opinion that supported 
the manner by which the MRC regulated racehorse owners.477 In-
deed, the Attorney General's broad interpretation of the MRC's 
power had been accepted as controlling by the court of appeals in 
an earlier decision.478 
Third, the legislative history of the statute and the agency pro-
vides convincing support for the court's conclusion.479 The MRC ex-
ercised the power to fine racehorse owners for decades and the leg-
islature made no attempt to curtail it through statutory 
amendments.48o Indeed, the inference of legislative acquiescence 
was solidified as early as 1947, when the General Assembly made an 
explicit reference to this power in creating the Relief Fund of the 
MRC.481 
It is rare to find a better example of a case in which all three 
of the primary methods of statutory construction point to the con-
474. See supra notes 322-26 and accompanying text. 
475. See supra notes 364-75 and accompanying text. 
476. See supra notes 369-75 and accompanying text. 
477. See supra notes 407'{)8 and accompanying text. 
478. See supra note 408 and accompanying text. 
479. See supra notes 326, 376-95 and accompanying text. 
480. See supra notes 409-18 and accompanying text. 
481. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 696 n.5, 684 A.2d 804, 
811 n.5 (1996). As the Lussier court noted: 
Id. 
The General Assembly has clearly been aware of the Maryland 
Racing Commission's regulation authorizing the imposition of fines 
upon racehorse owners, jockeys, trainers, and others, and has legis-
lated with respect to those fines. See, e.g., Ch 786 of the Acts of 1947, 
authorizing the Commission to establish 'the Relief Fund of the Ma-
ryland Racing Commission,' referring in both the title and the pre-
amble to the 'fines and [monetary] penalties ... collected from jock-
eys, trainers, owners and others,' and providing that such fines 
should continue to be paid into the Relief Fund. 
See also the Department of Fiscal Service's Sunset Review of the 
Maryland Racing Commission for 1989, at 37-38, referring to the 
Commission's authority to impose fines upon "general" licensees 
such as racehorse owners, trainers and jockeys, and commending the 
effectiveness of these monetary penalties. 
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elusion that the court of appeals properly reached. In narrowly fo-
cusing its attention on the statutory construction analysis, however, 
the court of appeals may have inadvertently altered the way future 
lower courts view the nondelegation doctrine in Maryland adminis-
trative law. 
In large part, the Lussier court ignored the constitutional issues 
raised on appeal and never conducted a nondelegation doctrine or 
separation of powers analysis.482 Instead, the Lussier court focused 
the bulk of its attention on construing the enabling statute at issue. 
The Lussier court merely applied a test of "consistency"483 to deter-
mine if the legislature had properly delegated the power to fine 
racehorse owners to the MRC. In reaching its verdict, the court 
seemed to ignore well-settled precedent. 
The three primary cases relied on by Lussier, hastily distin-
guished by the court of appeals, each demonstrated the appropriate 
inquiry into the constitutionality of a delegation of legislative power 
to the executive branch.484 This constitutional inquiry was necessa-
rily antecedent to resolving any statutory construction issue.485 The 
Lussier court merely "rubber-stamped" the MRC's authority to write 
a regulation absent specific legislative authority. An administrative 
agency's promulgation and enforcement of punitive regulations 
without specific statutory authority had, until Lussier, been unconsti-
tutiona1.486 Moreover, the court incorrectly rejected Lussier's reli-
ance on three significant administrative law opinions: Holy Cross, 
Gutwein, and Investor's Funding.487 
As to the constitutional argument raised by Lussier, the court 
began its analysis by stating that Holy Cross dealt with whether an ad-
ministrative agency's authority extends to the regulation of fees 
482. For a discussion of the court of appeals's limited constitutional analysis, see 
supra notes 453-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court of ap-
peals's statutory construction analysis see supra notes 465-81 and accompany-
ing text. 
483. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 687, 684 A.2d at 806·07 ("[T]he governing standard is 
whether the regulation is " 'consistent with the letter and spirit of the law 
under which the agency acts'» (quoting Christ v. Department of Natural Re-
sources, 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994) (quoting Department of 
Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74, 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987»». 
484. For a discussion of the court's limited constitutional analysis, see supra notes 
453-65 and accompanying text. 
485. See supra notes 208-62 and accompanying text. 
486. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 704, 684 A.2d at 815 (Bell, J. dissenting). 
487. See supra notes 208-18, 336-55, 376-95 and accompanying text. 
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charged by physicians.488 However, the Holy Cross court began its 
analysis with the premise that an administrative agency has no in-
herent powers and its powers do not reach beyond those provided 
by statute.489 The Holy Cross court, however, did not actually reach 
its statutory construction analysis because there was no evidence 
that "total costs of the hospital" included "fees of the physicians."49o 
Thus, because the fundamental premise of Holy Cross was that ad-
ministrative agencies lack power absent that conferred by statute, 
the Lussier court incorrectly categorized Holy Cross as merely a statu-
tory construction case. 
The court committed a similar error in addressing Lussier's re-
liance on Gutwein. According to the court, Gutwein dealt with an 
agency's authority to make an award of compensatory damages. 491 
488. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 685-86, 684 A.2d at 806. The court specifically stated 
that Holy Cross "was not concerned with the imposition of penalties; instead, 
the question in that case was whether, as a matter of statutory construction, 
an administrative agency's statutory authority to regulate hospital rates ex-
tended to fees charged by physicians to hospital patients." [d. 
489. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 683, 
393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978). The Holy Cross court stated: "It is elementary that 
since an administrative agency, such as the Commission, is a creature of stat-
ute, it has no inherent powers and its authority thus does not reach beyond 
the warrant provided by statute." [d. (citing Gutwein v. Easton Publ'g Co., 272 
Md. 563, 575-77, 325 A.2d 740, 747 (1974». After making this statement, the 
Holy Cross court proceeded to recite several canons of statutory construction. 
See id. at 684, 393 A.2d at 184-85. However, the court failed to reach the statu-
tory construction issue because it was impossible to determine whether physi-
cians' fees were included. See id. at 689, 393 A.2d at 187. 
490. [d. The court remanded for further proceedings to afford the Commission the 
opportunity to introduce evidence that the "total costs of the hospital" was a 
term of art and therefore included physicians' fees. [d. at 690, 393 A.2d at 187. 
The court stated that if the Commission could not produce evidence that phy-
sicians' fees were included in "total costs," then the Commission "has exceeded 
the power vested in it Uy the General Assembly." [d. (emphasis added). 
491. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. The Lussier court stated that 
Gutwein concerned the following: 
[W] hether, under the pertinent statutory provisions and "[i] n view of 
the [Human Relations] Commission's legislative background," the 
Human Relations Commission was authorized to make an award of 
compensatory damages to a victim of employment discrimination. 
Neither a penalty nor a regulation adopted by the agency was in-
volved in the Gutwein case. 
[d. However, the Gutwein court clearly stated that it had two reasons for deny-
ing the compensatory damages in addition to the legislative background that 
the Lussier court addressed. The Gutwein court also looked to the failure of 
the enabling statute to specifically authorize an award of compensatory dam-
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However, the Gutwein court specifically stated that in cases allowing 
monetary damages, the legislature has only used language "plainly 
indicative of a legislative intent to authorize monetary awards."492 
Therefore, if the legislature had intended to confer the power to 
award fines, Gutwein appears to stand for the proposition that the 
legislature must use language "plainly indicative" of that intent. 493 
Moreover, the Gutwein court specifically stated that a monetary dam-
age remedy is "not to be lightly implied. "494 
Finally, the Lussier court's rejection of Investor's Funding was 
flawed. The court of appeals noted that Lussier's reliance on Inves-
tor's Funding was misplaced because Investor's Funding dealt with the 
validity of a regulation in light of constitutional delegation of pow-
ers and due process principles.495 Lussier's basic contention was that 
the MRC lacked the authority to pass a regulation because the regu-
lation would exceed the MRC's authority and would therefore be an 
unconstitutional delegation of power.496 Thus, it would appear that 
Lussier's reliance on Investor's Funding was anything but misplaced. 
In rejecting Lussier's reliance on these cases, the court implied 
that when there is a broad statute delegating legislative power, a re-
viewing court's only inquiry should be one of statutory construction. 
This inquiry appears to supplant the court of appeals's prior consti-
tutional inquiry. 
ages, as well as the "unlikelihood of a legislative grant of unbridled power to 
an administrative agency to make monetary awards without guidelines or limi-
tations." Gutwein, 272 Md. at 576-77, 325 A.2d at 747. 
492. Gutwein, 272 Md. at 574, 325 A.2d at 746. However, the Gutwein court did note 
that no constitutional issue was raised, unlike Investar's Funding. See id. at 574 
n.lO, 325 A.2d at 746 n.lO. 
493. See id. 
494. Id. at 574, 325 A.2d at 746. 
495. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. However, the court's statement is 
partially incorrect. In Investar's Funding, there was a statute specifically author-
izing the fine, but the court stated that such a delegation without legislative safe-
guards was invalid. See County Council v. Investor's Funding Corp., 270 Md. 
403,441, 312 A.2d 225, 246 (1973). In Lussier, there was no specific delegation 
of the power to fine, nor could there be any legislative standards or safe-
guards accompanying the implied power. Therefore, under Investar's Funding 
and Pressman, the statute could have been invalidated not only because there 
was no specific delegation, but also because, a fartiari, there were no standards 
or safeguards. For a discussion of Investar's Funding, see supra notes 208-18 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of Pressman, see supra notes 239-62 and 
accompanying text. 
496. See supra note 450 and accompanying text. 
1998] Lussier v. MRC 579 
B. Future Impact on Maryland Law 
Lussier may have altered the way Maryland's courts approach 
similar administrative law issues. Lussier's greatest impact is that it 
may have eliminated the requirement of legislative standards or 
safeguards in delegations of administrative authority. The Lussier 
court intimated that lower courts should focus merely upon 
whether the challenged statutory interpretation by the administra-
tive agency is consistent with the purpose of the agency's enabling 
legislation.497 
Judge Bell, however, noted that until Lussier, the delegation of 
legislative authority without legislative standards or safeguards has 
previously been held to be unconstitutiona1.498 In fact, a reviewing 
court would first inquire whether the authority was constitutionally 
delegable.499 To determine the constitutionality of the power dele-
gated, the reviewing court must decide whether the statute was ac-
companied by adequate safeguards or standards or exempt from 
these requirements because it was impracticable for the legislature 
to fix standards or safeguards.5°O However, under Lussier, the consti-
497. See supra note 465, 483 and accompanying text. 
498. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 706 .. fJ7, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell,]., dissenting). Judge Bell 
limited his criticism to the lack of a constitutional inquiry. See id. at 707-08, 
684 A.2d at 817 (Bell, J., dissenting). He noted that prior case law considered 
whether a power was delegable, and if so, whether the delegation was constitu-
tional. See id. at 707, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell,]., dissenting). If constitutional, the 
court would apply statutory construction in some cases. See id. at 717, 684 A.2d 
at 822 (Bell,]., dissenting). Judge Bell also noted that the issue was not 
whether the MRC could regulate licensure, but whether they could fine. See 
id. at 709-10, 684 A.2d at 818 (Bell,]., dissenting). Judge Bell stated that this 
issue is distinguishable from Christ in which the issue was analogous to licen-
sure. See id. at 714-15,684 A.2d at 820 (Bell,]., dissenting). Interestingly, Judge 
Bell quoted the intelligible principle test as enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in an early non delegation doctrine case. See id. at 705-06, 684 A.2d at 816 
(Bell,]., dissenting) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394, 409 (1928». For a discussion of J W. Hampton and earlier Supreme 
Court non delegation doctrine precedent, see supra notes 70-102 and accompa-
nying text. 
499. See supra text accompanying notes 263-66. 
500. See supra text accompanying notes 263-66. Maryland has all but eliminated the 
standards requirement, which places them in the most liberal category of 
states in permitting broad delegations of power to agencies. It is interesting to 
note that Maryland is the only state in this category that has the most restric-
tive type of separation of powers provision. See supra notes 162-79 and accom-
panying text. But see Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 82, 532 
A.2d 1056, 1065 (1987) (noting that the requirement under Maryland's separa-
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tutional line of inquiry is given considerably less attention, and po-
tentially rendered impotent. 
Judge Bell recognized that the court validated a statute without 
determining whether it was accompanied by adequate standards or 
safeguards.50l The enabling statute was silent as to whether the MRC 
could create a regulation that would allow it to impose fines on 
racehorse owners.502 One point that the Lussier court overlooked was 
that the enabling statute could not possibly contain legislative stan-
dards or safeguards on the exercise of this power because the grant 
of power was merely implicit. Under Pressman, the only way that an 
enabling statute that lacks standards or safeguards can survive con-
stitutional scrutiny is if it falls within the impracticability excep-
tion.503 However, the Lussier court never inquired whether the Press-
man exception of impracticability was met. Therefore, Lussier could 
be read to .implicitly overrule both the requirements of legislative 
standards or safeguards requirement as well as the alternative re-
quirement of impracticability.504 
Furthermore, the cases leading up to Pressman, as well as its 
progeny, established a limited category of exceptions to standard-
less delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies.505 
Formerly, the relaxed standards and safeguards requirements only 
applied to a limited category of agency acts that dealt with areas 
such as public health and safety.506 By upholding the MRC's regula-
tion without any constitutional inquiry, the Lussier court seemingly 
approved a regulation outside the traditional areas of administrative 
law that are accorded more liberal treatment. One logical conclu-
sion lower courts might draw from the Lussier opinion is that the 
court of appeals has rejected the need for these special categories, 
opting instead to treat all delegations liberally.507 
tion of powers provision is no higher than the bar under the United States 
Constitution) . 
501. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 707-{)8, 684 A.2d at 817 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
502. See supra note 406 and accompanying text. 
503. See supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text. 
504. The legislature, in fact, provided no safeguards whatsoever because the power 
to fine was not specifically included in the enabling statute. 
505. See supra notes 192-238 and accompanying text. 
506. See supra notes 192-262 apd accompanying text. 
507. At the very least, the Lussier court created a new administrative regime that 
meets the impracticability exception established by the Pressman court. For a 
discussion of Pressman, see supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text. 
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Further, the Lussier court declined to provide standards to help 
courts evaluate administrative regulations in the future. The court 
of appeals simply held that because the regulation at issue was con-
sistent with the purpose of the statute, it was a valid exercise of 
power.50S Thus, it appears as though an administrative agency's 
power under a broad enabling statute is limited only by what is con-
sistent with the purpose of the statute. 
Finally, administrative agencies now have significant powers to 
implement their remedies, notwithstanding the possible punitive na-
ture of the sanctions. The inescapable conclusion is that administra-
tive agencies may award compensatory damages, fine individuals, or 
impose other sanctions as long as the sanctions are consistent with 
the purpose of the agency's enabling statute. 
C. Alternative Approaches to the Power to Fine 
The power to impose a fine occupies a unique place in admin-
istrative law.509 Although the nondelegation doctrine acts to protect 
against delegations that could be abused by administrative agen-
cies,510 some courts impose stricter applications of the legislative 
standards requirement and more conservative approaches to their 
statutory construction analysis.511 These judicial efforts are aimed at 
preventing abuses of power by administrative agencies.512 
1. Florida 
In Continental Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund,513 Continental appealed a final order of the 
Board that assessed a fine due to Continental's unauthorized use of 
sovereign submerged lands.514 Continental argued that the penalty 
imposed upon them violated Florida's Constitution.515 The constitu-
tional provision relied on by Continental provided: "No administra-
508. See supra notes 465, 483 and accompanying text. 
509. Indeed, Judge Bell likened the power to fine to a criminal sanction. See 
Lussier, 343 Md. at 709 n.7, 684 A.2d at 817 n.7 (Bell,]., dissenting) ("When a 
fine or penalty is imposed ... by any ordinance of any incorporated city or 
town in this State . . . such act shall be deemed to be a criminal offense un-
less the offense is defined as a municipal infraction." (quoting MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 38, § 1 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
510. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
511. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. 
512. See infra notes 513-45 and accompanying text. 
513. 464 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1985). 
514. See id. at 205. 
515. See id. 
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tive agency shall impose a sentence of imprisonment, nor shall it 
impose any other penalty except as provided by law. "516 The court 
agreed and explained that the legislative statute granting the Board 
broad authority to "police, protect, conserve, improve; ... or take 
such other action or do such other things as necessary for the full 
protection and conservation of the said lands" did not contain ex-
press or specific language granting the Board the authority to im-
pose a fine.517 Therefore, the court held that the rule, promulgated 
by the Board to assess fines, violated Florida's constitution and was 
invalid.5ls 
2. California 
In People v. Harter Packing Co.,519 the Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia also addressed the issue of whether an administrative agency 
may promulgate rules to impose penalties.520 The California legisla-
ture promulgated the Marketing Act of 1937 in an effort to pro-
mote the marketing of agriculture products.521 The Act provided the 
Director of Agriculture with the express authority to issue market-
ing orders to regulate producer marketing, handling, processing 
and distribution of agriculture products pursuant to the Act.522 The 
Act also granted the Director the authority to impose a penalty fine 
of up to $500 for each violation of the Act.523 
The Director issued a marketing order outlining specific guide-
516. Id. at 206. 
517. Id. at 207. 
518. See id.; see also Department of Envtl. Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 
988, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the "law is clear that an 
agency's authority to impose sanctions must be expressly delegated to the 
agency"); Division of Admin. Hearings v. Department of Transp., 534 So. 2d 
1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an agency did not have 
necessary legislative authority to adopt rule allowing hearing officer to impose 
sanction). See generaUy Dan R. Stengle & James Parker Rhea, Putting the Genie 
Back in the Bottle: The Legislative Struggle to Contain Rulemaking Uy Executive Agen-
cies, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415 (1993). The authors summarize Florida's re-
quirement that "[aln enabling statute, however, may not provide unbridled 
authority to an administrative agency to decide what the law is. A statute pro-
viding such a legislative authorization must ... declare the legislative policy or 
standard, and must operate to limit the delegated power." Id. at 415-16. (foot-
note omitted). 
519. 325 P.2d 519 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
520. See id. at 521. 
521. See id. at 520. 
522. See id. at 520-21. 
523. See id. 
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lines for canning and freezing peaches.524 In the order, the Director 
established that violations of the order would be determined based 
on the tonnage of non-conforming peaches.525 Specifically, each five 
tons, or portion thereof, was considered a single violation of the or-
der.526 As a result of this order, Harter Packing Company was fined 
$5093.527 
Initially, the court explained that an administrative agency is a 
creature of statute that only possesses the powers specifically 
granted to it by the legislature.528 The court found that the market-
ing order penalty provision, promulgated by the Director, was not 
authorized by the Act.529 The court noted that" [ilf the act under 
which the administrative agency gets its powers provides no sanc-
tions or penalties for failure to comply, the agency may not by rule 
promulgate them. "530 From this logic, the court concluded that the 
Director could not enlarge a penalty provision in the Act to declare 
a different penalty.53! 
3. Rhode Island 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether an ad-
ministrative agency had the implied authority to impose civil fines 
against violators of its regulations in F. Ronci Co. v. Narragansett Bay 
Water Quality Management District Commission.532 The Rhode Island 
General Assembly created the Water Quality ManagementCommis-
sion to combat water-quality problems arising from the discharge of 
pollutants into Narragansett Bay.533 Mter Ronci, a manufacturer, 
continually failed to comply with the Commission's discharge regu-
lations, the Commission commenced enforcement proceedings.534 
The Commission ordered the manufacturer to comply within a 
given time period and to pay a civil penalty in the amount of 
$219,950 for its violations.535 The Commission claimed that it had 
the authority to issue the fine under its enabling statute that read: 
524. See id. at 519-20. 
525. See id. at 520. 
526. See id. 
527. See id. 
528. See id. at 521. 
529. See id. 
530. Id. 
531. See id. 
532. 561 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1989). 
533. See id. at 875. 
534. See id. at 876. 
535. See id. 
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"[T]he executive director may institute such civil or criminal pro-
ceedings ... for the violation of any provisions of [certain sections 
of the enabling statute] or of any permit, rule, regulation or order 
issued pursuant thereto."536 The Commission argued that the cited 
language granted the agency the option to choose between an ad-
ministrative or a judicial forum for the pursuit of remedies, and 
thus its levy of a civil fine through the administrative proceeding 
was permissible.537 
The court rejected the Commission's position, holding that the 
plain language of the statute clearly established that after an ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, the executive director could 
then choose to institute proceedings for noncompliance in the Su-
perior Court for the county.538 The statute did not grant an inde-
pendent choice to levy fines at the administrative level, and such a 
levy was an extension of the agency's power beyond the scope of 
the enabling legislation.539 The court reasoned that while an admin-
istrative agency does have rather broad discretion to promulgate 
regulations based on an interpretation of the enabling legislation, it 
may not do so absent a specific or implied grant of authority.540 The 
court found that the levying of civil fines was neither express nor 
implied in the statutory language and in fact was in "direct contra-
diction to the specific powers enumerated in their enabling 
legislation."541 ' 
The court bolstered its opinion by pointing to a recent amend-
ment of the enabling legislation that allowed the Commission to im-
pose administrative penalties in addition to those remedies promul-
gated in the original enactment.542 The court contrasted the specific 
and express grant of authority in the amendment with the absence 
of any such language in the original statute.543 Noting that the 
amending language represented "precisely the type of specific statu-
tory grant that the commission needed before levying a civil fine 
against the plaintiff,"544 the court held that at the time of the dis-
pute, the Commission had no power to require the manufacturer to 
536. Id. at 880. 
537. See id. 
538. See id. 
539. See id. at 881. 
540. See id. 
541. Id. 
542. See id. 
543. See id. 
544. Id. 
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pay the levied fine.545 
Each jurisdiction surveyed imposes restrictions on the power to 
fine when conferred to administrative agencies. These cases demon-
strate the reluctance of courts to allow administrative agencies the 
unbridled power to promulgate punitive regulations, even pursuant 
to broad statutory grants, without Jegislative standards or procedural 
safeguards to prevent abuse by the administrative agency.546 
D. Recommendations to Practitioners 
Practitioners challenging the validity of administrative regula-
tions should emphasize that a challenged power is inconsistent with 
the enabling statute's purpose. In light of Lussier, this appears to be 
the only certain method of demonstrating that a regulation is inva-
lid. Conversely, administrative agencies may cite the broad power 
deemed valid in Lussier as support for a sweeping range of regula-
tions. If the court of appeals continues to apply the Lussier frame-
work to delegations of power by the General Assembly, administra-
tive agencies will have broad powers under their enabling statutes 
that are limited, not by Maryland's separation of powers provision, 
but merely by future courts' interpretations of legislative intent. 
As the inquiry presently exists, standards and safeguards are 
not necessarily required to accompany delegations.547 Therefore, in-
dividuals subject to an agency's regulations are open to great risk 
from the arbitrary exercise of agency power. Moreover, individuals 
may now be subject to harsh penalties with little hope of recourse, 
either political or lega1.548 This is the broadest implication that the 
545. See id. 
546. See supra notes 513-45 and accompanying text; see also In re Fayetteville Hotel 
Assocs., 450 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the power to im-
pose sanctions requires specific legislative authority and without such author-
ity, the power to impose sanctions "would exceed the Commission's general 
rulemaking authority"); Columbus Wine Co. v. Sheffield, 64 S.E.2d 356, 362 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that an administrative agency could not, "by reg-
ulation, make penal something not made penal under the law itself, but could 
only enforce its regulations by suspension or cancellation of licenses); Groves 
v. Modified Retirement Plan, 803 F.2d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that al-
though an administrative agency has broad discretion to implement remedial 
legislation, it may not penalize absent express authority from the legislature). 
Under Pressman and Lussier, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
expressed a more liberal approach to the implied powers of administrative 
agencies than jurisdictions surveyed. 
547. See supra notes 497-507 and accompanying text. 
548. Members of administrative agencies are not elected, so it is impossible to 
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Lussier opinion could have. 
However, it is unlikely that the court of appeals would abandon 
the entire framework for deciding nondelegation doctrine cases. In-
stead, the Lussier opinion indicates the reluctance of the majority of 
the court of appeals to strike enabling legislation purely on 
nondelegation grounds. The majority'S position will at least require 
a practitioner to creatively phrase future nondelegation doctrine 
challenges. 
Thus, a nondelegation doctrine challenge should be presented 
by litigants in the alternative. First, the litigant must assert that the 
power exercised by the agency extended beyond the power the leg-
islature may constitutionally delegate. As evidenced by Lussier, the 
court of appeals is extremely reluctant to acknowledge this pure 
nondelegation argument. A litigant can create an escape hatch for 
the court by positing a statutory construction argument through the 
canon of judicial restraint.549 
To lead the court into invoking the canon of judicial restraint, 
a litigant should assert, in the alternative, that the power exercised 
by the agency went beyond that which was delegated by the legisla-
ture. This argument should employ the traditional canons of statu-
tory construction.550 Additionally, the litigant should remind the 
court of its duty to rule on non-constitutional grounds whenever 
feasible.55 ! If the agency's act is indicative of standard-less power, a 
court could be persuaded to infer that legislature never would have 
intended to grant such power to the agency because it would violate 
the nondelegation doctrine.552 By presenting these arguments in the 
"vote out" an administrator who engages in disfavorable conduct. 1 FRANK E. 
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 37-39 (1965). One scholar has noted that 
as administrative power increases, the court's power decreases in several ways. 
See id. (noting seven distinct negative effects occurring as administrative inde-
pendence develops). However, on the federal level, administrative agencies are 
presently being held vicariously liable through the President. See supra notes 
13941 and accompanying text. 
549. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text. 
550. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text. 
551. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text. Cf. Gutwein v. Easton Publ'g 
Co., 272 Md. 563, 576-77, 325 A.2d 740,747 (1974). 
552. Cf. Gutwein, at 576-77, 325 A.2d 747. The Gutwein court intimated that this 
type of argument may prove particularly persuasive when if concluded its 
opinion as follows: 
In view of the Commission's legislative background, the failure of [its 
enabling statute] to specifically authorize an award of compensatory 
damages, the unlikelihood of a legislative grant of unbridled power to an ad-
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alternative, and highlighting the permissible inference of legislative 
intent, a litigant is more likely to prevail than when the argument is 
based solely upon constitutional grounds.553 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Lussier court held that an administrative agency's authority 
to create a regulation that enabled the agency to impose a fine was 
valid under a broad statute granting the power to regulate horse 
racing.554 The opinion stands for validating any broad delegations of 
authority, as long as the authority is consistent with the statutory 
purpose and does not contradict the language or purpose of the 
statute.555 
There is no doubt that the General Assembly can enable an 
agency with the power to create regulations that authorize fines. 
Prior to Lussier, however, this type of delegation of power had to be 
accompanied by legislative standards or safeguards, unless the 
agency's jurisdiction fell within one of the carefully defined areas of 
regulatory authority and met the Pressman impracticability excep-
tion.556 Mter Lussier, it appears as though a delegation of quasi-
legislative power need not contain standards or safeguards, nor 
must it fall within a category of authority subject to the Pressman 
exception. 
By not undertaking its customary constitutional analysis, the 
Lussier court may have compromised its previous requirement of 
legislative standards or safeguards accompanying delegations of au-
thority. Furthermore, the Lussier holding broadened the powers 
agencies can now imply to include the power to fine. This holding 
contravenes prior case law and violates Maryland's separation of 
ministrative agency to make monetary awards without guidelines (fT limi-
tations, and the cited cases, we conclude that the Commission's order 
granting Gutwein six weeks' loss of pay and moving expenses was 
plainly beyond its power and jurisdiction. 
Id. (emphasis added). One reason why the court may not have embraced the 
canon of judicial restraint is because Gutwein did not challenge the constitu-
tionality of the power delegated to the Commission. See id. at 576 n.lO, 325 
A.2d at 746 n.lO. 
553. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text. 
554. For a discussion of the enabling statute in Lussier, see supra notes 403"()6 and 
accompanying text. 
555. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 688, 684 A.2d 804, 807 
(1996). 
556. See supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text. 
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powers principle.557 To prevent the unintended erosion of the 
non delegation doctrine in Maryland, it may be necessary for the 
court to reaffirm both its constitutional inquiry as a threshold issue 
to any statutory construction analysis, as well as its requirement of 
legislative standards to prevent abuse. 
Gregory C. Ward 
557. For a discussion of the separation of powers principle, see supra notes 183-91 
and accompanying text. 
